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INFORMATION ECONOMICS AND 
CHEMICAL TOXICITY: DESIGNING LAWS 
TQ PRODUCE AND USE DATA 
Mary L. Lyndon* 
INTRODUCTION 
Just as laws may create entitlements to the use of information, they 
may also be written to distribute information and to encourage infor-
mation production. This Article discusses the ways in which law af-
fects the generation and distribution of information related to 
chemical exposure and toxicity. 1 It describes the economic impact of 
recently enacted right-to-know laws2 and proposes that better and 
• Associate Professor, St. John's University School of Law. B.A. 1969, Manhattanville Col-
lege; J.D. 1974, Northeastern; LL.M. 19S7, Columbia; 1985 Julius Silver Fellow in Law, Science, 
and Technology at Columbia University Law School. - Ed. The author thanks Harold S.H. 
Edgar, Susan Rose-Ackerman, Frank P. Grad, Richard R. Nelson, Maxwell Gregg Bloche, 
Daniel D. Polsby, and Howard A. Latin for their helpful comments on working drafts of this 
Article. 
1. Petroleum byproducts and derivatives, synthetic organic chemicals, and inorganic chemi-
cals, including asbestos and heavy metals, are the categories of substances that pose the greatest 
risks to health through occupational and environmental exposures. See Schroeder, A Decade of 
Change in Regulating the Chemical Industry, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. l, 4-9 (Summer 
1983). The manufacturing sector of the economy is the source of the bulk of the chemicals 
introduced into the workplace, the environment, and consumer products. For example, OSHA 
has determined that the manufacturing sector employs almost one third of the nation's workers, 
but accounts for one half of chemically related occupational disease. 48 Fed. Reg. 53,285 (1983). 
The industries within the manufacturing sector that are of the greatest concern are petroleum 
firms and chemical producers. The term "chemical" will be used generically in this Article to 
indicate both the products and wastes of these industries. 
2. Federal law requiring dissemination of toxicity data for chemicals used in industry is con-
tained primarily in two sources: (1) the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know 
Act of 1986 (EPCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1101 (Supp. IV 1986), which was enacted as Title III of the 
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 19&6 (SARA); and (2) the OSHA Hazard 
Communication Standard, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1987). The EPA is currently completing reg-
ulations mandated by SARA. 52 Fed. Reg. 38,344 (1987) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 370); see 
also M. KRIZ, CHEMICALS AND THE COMMUNITY: NEW LAW, NEW REsPONSIBILIDES (1987). 
Earlier federal environmental and consumer protection statutes contain a variety of more 
limited disclosure requirements. The EPA was directed by the Resources Conservation Recov-
ery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1982), to establish a hazardous waste management system which 
includes a manifest system. In addition, pesticides must be labeled with their active ingredients 
and a registration number, pursuant to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 
(FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1982). Products regulated pursuant to the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act must be labeled with their ingredients. 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1982). The Consumer 
Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2051 (1982), authorizes the Consumer Product Safety Commis-
sion (CPSC) to promulgate labeling requirements. Labeling of hazardous materials in transit has 
been required by the U.S. Department of Transportation pursuant to the Hazardous Materials 
Transportation Act of 1974, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1801 (1982). 
Right-to-know laws adopt a more aggressive approach to the use of information than the 
earlier statutes. They reach a broader segment of the population and require disclosure of all 
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more abundant data could be produced if the law paid greater atten-
tion to basic economic principles that influence research and informa-
tion systems. 
Toxicity information is necessary for intelligent private choices, as 
well as for the protection of public health. Yet the manufacturers and 
industrial users of commercial chemicals have little incentive to pro-
duce and distribute data about chemicals' adverse side effects and, in-
deed, even the identity of these chemicals. Because generic product 
trade names have been substituted in the public domain for more spe-
cific and informative chemical names, 3 it has been difficult for those 
who use chemicals, or for third parties, to undertake the task of data 
collection. As a result, the nature and extent of human exposure to 
chemicals have been masked. 
The relative invisibility of chemicals hampers the market's ability 
to screen chemicals for toxicity and has hindered the development of 
chemical information services. The lack of data has also handicapped 
the scientific study of the health and environmental effects of indus-
trial chemicals; and it has profoundly affected the law's attempt to 
deter and to compensate for chemical harms.4 
known health effects of a chemical, an advance on the ingredient labeling approach that evolved 
in the 1970s. 
This Article uses the term "right-to-know law" to include the rules contained in the OSHA 
Hazard Communication Standard. The two names may be read as having distinct conceptual 
roots and very different implications which are not explored in this Article. See generally Baram, 
The Right to Know and the Duty to Disclose Hazard Information, 74 AM. J. Pus. HEALTH 385 
(1984); Note, A Duty to Warn, A Right to Know: Odgers v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation, 
1986 DET. C. L. REv. 163; Note, Occupational Health Risks and the Worker's Right to Know, 90 
YALE L.J. 1792 (1981) (making efficiency and normative arguments for the worker's right to 
know). 
3. Familiar consumer products such as Windex, Fantastic, and Drano are examples of chem-
ical mixtures whose ingredients are unknown to their users. Commercial users of chemicals also 
rely on trade names. The lack of more specific information abut these products can lead to their 
misuse and hinder medical treatment of persons injured by exposure. See infra notes 40-41, 49. 
4. There is an extensive literature on proposals for use of market incentives to reduce pollu-
tion. The lack of adequate toxicity data has been a recurring theme; but for the most part, 
commentators have accepted the current lack of data as a part of the regulatory landscape and 
worked around it. Two important exceptions are Schroeder & Shapiro, Responses to Occupa-
tional Disease: The Role of Markets, Regulation, and Information, 72 GEO. L.J. 1231 (1984) 
(identifying lack of information as a key element in the failure to protect workers from occupa-
tional disease), and Latin, Environmental Deregulation and Consumer Decisionmaking Under 
Uncertainty, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 187 (1982) (emphasizing that sound environmental deci-
sionmaking requires extensive data not produced by an unregulated market) [hereinafter Latin, 
Environmental Uncertainty]. See also Portney, Toxic Substance Policy and the Protection of 
Human Health, in CURRENT ISSUES IN U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 105 (1978) (proposing 
limited measures to cope with disincentives to information production). 
The main focus of scholarly discussion has been whether and how to apply market incentives, 
as opposed to "command and control" technology-based standards, to the control of pollution. 
See, e.g .. Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards 
and "Fine-Tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267 (1985); Ackerman & Stewart, 
Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985) (commenting on Latin); Stewart, 
Economics, Environment, and the Limits of Legal Control, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1985); 
June 1989] Information Economics 1797 
Attempts to remedy the problem have, for the most part, consisted 
of complex s_tatutory schemes which empower administrative agencies 
to control various forms of pollution. A central challenge for regula-
tors has been to strike an appropriate balance between the costs and 
benefits of regulation. As risk assessment has assumed a more central 
role in chemical regulation, uncertainty about chemicals' actual health 
effects has become a dominant theme in the debate over whether, as a 
society, we are spending too much or too little on pollution control.5 
Some of this uncertainty results from the slow evolution of toxicology 
and the complexity of toxicology's findings; additionally, of course, 
some uncertainty is inherent in the characteristics of chemical com-
merce and consumption. However, not all of the uncertainty is so 
intractable; improved production and dissemination of toxicological 
data would go far· to alleviate this problem. In a system such as ours, 
which has increasingly relied upon health effects data to legitimize 
controls, information strategies should be a central concern. 
The 1980s have seen the emergence of right-to-know laws and the 
Hazard Communication Standard of the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA). These laws trace their jurispruden-
tial roots to the doctrine of informed consent and utilize the economic 
principles incorporated in consumer protection regulation. They at-
tempt to make better use of existing data by requiring its distribution 
to chemical purchasers and workers, to local government officials, 
and, under some circumstances, to the general public. This new avail-
ability of data should facilitate market mechanisms for differentiating 
among the toxicity levels of different chemicals. But while right-to-
know laws are an important advance in regulation, their accomplish-
ments are likely to be limited, since they cover only a small proportion 
of the relevant universe of chemicals in use. Moreover, the legal con-
text in which they operate often works at cross purposes with informa-
tion dynamics. 
The analysis presented here suggests that the law can move beyond 
Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A Conceptual Framework, 69 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1256 (1981) [hereinafter Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law]. 
5. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 777-82 (E.D.N.Y. 
1984) (discussing "[t]he distinction between avoidance of risk through regulation and compensa-
tion for injuries after the fact"); Crandall & Lave, Introduction and Summary, in THE SCIEN-
TIFIC BASIS OF HEALTH AND SAFETY REGULATION 3-5 (1981); Samuels, The Uncertainty 
Factor, in MANAGEMENT OF AssESSED RISK FOR CARCINOGENS 269 (W. Nicholson ed. 1981) 
[hereinafter MANAGEMENT OF AsSESSED RISK]; Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The 
Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 Cow~. L. REV. 277 (1985); Latin, Envi-
ronmental Uncertainty, supra note 4; Schwartz, Product Liability, Corporate Structure, and 
Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship, 14 J. LEG. STUD. 689 (1985); 
Shaven, Uncertainty Over Causation and the Determination of Civil Liability, 28 J. L. & EcoN. 
587 (1985). 
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disclosure provisions to become more fundamentally attuned to the 
nature of the informational problem that underlies the regulatory cost-
benefit dilemma. If we think of information in a more explicitly eco-
nomic framework, new options for the production and use of data be-
gin to appear, ·including the intriguing possibility of a more robust 
private market for toxicology. The legal system can be structured to 
respond more fully to the possibilities of research and development in 
this area. 
Several developments support taking a fresh look at the problem. 
Toxicology, computer science, and information management science 
have matured considerably in the past two decades.6 We can now pro-
duce more information about toxicity and manage the data much 
more effectively than we could in the early 1970s, when the environ-
mental regulatory scheme was first established. New environmental 
technologies and service professions have evolved, and the short his-
tory of environmental regulation has provided experience with a vari-
ety of legal rules and systems. These conditions pave the way for a 
more focused information strategy for toxics regulation. 7 
Basic work in the economics of information provides us with some 
tools with which to analyze the nature and behavior of data related to 
chemicals. 8 Economists have produced an extensive literature on the 
role of information in the market, examining the ways in which asym-
metries of information affect market structure and product quality. 
They have also described market responses to these asymmetries, in-
cluding information pooling, advertising, and the development of 
third-party providers of information. This Article draws on this work 
to describe the. ways in which toxicity and exposure data are used, 
6. See, e.g., H. PAGELS, THE DREAMS OF REASON - THE COMPUTER AND THE RISE OF 
THE SCIENCES OF COMPLEXITY (1988); Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structure 
of Securities Regulation, 98 HARV. L. REv. 747 (1985) (elaborating on the impact and opportuni-
ties of computer technology in securities regulation). 
7. See 1 M. PORAT, THE INFORMATION ECONOMY: DEFINITION AND MANAGEMENT 8 
(1977): 
As information technologies "invade" various sectors of the economy, old arrangements 
may come into conflict with the new. Applications of the new technologies may raise either 
economic issues or value conflicts that previously lay dormant. The seeds of tomorrow's 
opportunities and difficulties are sown today. And therein lies the presumption that infor· 
mation policy should adopt a prospective look at future applications of information 
technology. 
8. See Joskow & Noll, Regulation in Theory and Practice: An Overview, in STUDIES IN PUB· 
LIC REGULATION 1 (G. Fromm ed. 1981); R. BARTLETT & u. APTE, INFORMATION, UNCER· 
TAINTY AND REGULATION IN ATTACKING REGULATORY PROBLEMS - AN AGENDA FOR 
RESEARCH IN THE 1980'S 19-39 (1981); F. THOMPSON & L. JONES, REGULATORY POLICY AND 
PRACTICES: REGULATING BETTER AND REGULATING BEST 67-84 (1982); THE REGULATION 
GAME: How BRmSH AND WEST GERMAN COMPANIES BARGAIN WITH GOVERNMENT 12-13 
(A. Peacock ed. 1984); Simon, Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations, 69 AM. 
EcoN. REv. 493 (1979). 
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both in the market and in the legal system, and to explore ways in 
which the law could concern itself with information in order to en-
courage optimal investments in chemical safety. 
Part I describes the multiple uses of toxicity and exposure data. 
The information can have value to many agents in the economy, in the 
sciences, and in the law, since its production and distribution reduce a 
variety of costs to individuals, firms, and government. This is data 
that saves lives and reduces liability by making possible the prevention 
and treatment of disease related to chemical exposure. . 
Part II addresses the market's failure to produce toxicity and expo-
sure data. It identifies the reasons for the lack of data and discusses 
the effects of this problem on the market for chemicals. Part III de-
scribes the effect the law has had on information production. It sug-
gests that tort liability, administrative exposure standards, and 
reporting requirements do not correct the market failure and may, in 
fact, aggravate it. Direct government investment in data production 
has been the most effective response, but this effort has not been sub-
stantial enough to cope with the numbers of chemicals that merit 
study. 
Part IV describes right-to-know laws. It suggests that, since the 
permutations of the many chemicals in use ~d the types and 9ombi-
nations of human exposures cannot be screened adequately by a cen-
tral agency, polycentric decisionmaking is a logical development in 
toxics control. Part V proposes to expand and improve ciata produc-
tion with funding and planning modeled upon the Superfund and na-
tional contingency plan approach, now used for hazardous waste 
cleanup. Linking public research costs to their private economic ori-
gins and opening up the possibilities for independent research could 
encourage cost avoidance by the producers. of chemical products. Part 
VI suggests that toxicity data collection and management should be 
conducted according to principles that will foster: an accessible na-
tional data system, one which would be a resource analogous _to a, util-
ity or common carrier service. · . · · · . 
The Article concludes, in Part VII, with some observations on the 
functions of information in toxics control and the confusion .that 
prev3:ils in the existing statutory scheme. 
I. THE USES OF TOXICITY AND EXPOSURE DATA 
Worldwide production of organic chemicals ros·e from 7 million 
metric tons in 1950 to about 250 million metric tons in 1985.9 Many 
9. UNEP, Chemicals in International Trade, 17 ENVTL. POLY. & L. 66 (1987). Production 
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of today's chemicals did not exist a decade or two ago, but are now 
pervasive in the environment.10 In the United States, chemicals are 
handled in every sector of the economy and in every home. 11 They are 
discharged into the environment in every medium, 12 and chemical ac-
of synthetic organic chemicals in the United States rose from 1.3 billion pounds in 1940 to 320 
billion pounds in 1978. R. NADER, R. BROWNSTEIN & J. RICHARD, WHO'S POISONING 
AMERICA 5 (1981). A presidential panel reported a 581 % increase in production of synthetic 
organic chemical products between 1949 and 1969. Production of raw materials and in· 
termediates rose 1150% in the same period. Panel on Chemicals and Health, President's Science 
Advisory Committee, CHEMICALS AND HEALTH 78 (1973) [hereinafter .CHEMICALS AND 
HEALTH]. The panel calculated that the total amount of manufactured consumer organic chemi· 
cals was 500 lbs. per capita. Id. at 27. Figures quoted by F.D. Hoerger, of the Dow Chemical 
Company, are somewhat different: an increase in U.S. production of synthetic organic chemicals 
from 4 billion pounds in 1940 to 228 billion pounds in 1979. Hoerger, Indicators of Exposure 
Trends, in BANBURY REPORT 9: QUANTIFICATION OF OCCUPATIONAL CANCER 435, 438 (1981) 
[hereinafter BANBURY REPORT 9]. See also Schroeder, supra note 1. However, aggregate pro· 
duction figures may sometimes be misleading because chemicals do not all have the same health 
impacts. Nor does the number of chemicals indicate the extent of human exposure. Seventy 
percent of all chemicals in production in the United States have annual production volumes of 
less than 100,000 pounds. Hoerger, supra, at 440. 
JO. Figures vary on the number of chemicals now in use. In 1983, OSHA estimated that as 
many as 575,000 chemical products might be in use, with hundreds of new ones introduced 
annually. 48 Fed. Reg. 53,323 (1983). Pursuant to the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 
15 U.S.C. § 2601 (1982), the EPA reports that nearly 66,000 commercial chemical substances 
have been identified by manufacturers or importers since 1975. See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION 
AGENCY, TOXIC SUBSI'ANCES CONTROL ACT (TSCA): REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR FISCAL 
YEAR 1986, at 4 (1987) [hereinafter TSCA 1986 REPORT]; OFFICE OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES, U.S. 
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, THE LAYMAN'S GUIDE TO THE TOXIC SUBSI'ANCES CONTROL 
ACT 6 (1987) (EPA 560/1-87-011) [hereinafter LAYMAN'S GUIDE]. The National Research 
Council has estimated that there are 65, 725 substances currently in use that are of possible toxi-
cological concern. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, TOXICITY TESTING: STRATEGIES TO DE· 
TERMINE NEEDS AND PRIORmES (1984) [hereinafter TOXICITY TESTING]. 
11. The average household uses a wide variety of hazardous substances, often as ingredients 
of such products as toilet bowl cleaners, fabric softeners, spot removers, bleach, disinfectants, 
polishes, and paint removers. M. GREENBERG & R. ANDERSON, HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES 4 
(1984). 
EP A's five-year Total Exposure Assessment Methodology (TEAM) study of personal expo-
sures has identified consumer products in the home as a potentially greater source of toxic expo-
sure to volatile chemicals than outdoor sources. EPA Air Toxics Study Turns Up Surprises, 
COMMUNITY RIGHT·TO·KNOW NEWS, Sept. 22, 1987, at 7-8. EPA has suggested that "[i]t 
seems probable that consumer products (paints, cleaners, propellants, plastics, cosmetics, etc.) 
and building materials (adhesives, fixers, resins, insulation, etc.) comprise the major source cate-
gories of exposure." Id. Davis, Bridbord & Schneiderman report, in Estimating Cancer Causes: 
Problems in Methodology, Production, and Trends, in BANBURY REPORT 9, supra note 9, at 285, 
296, report that it is difficult for epidemiologists to identify control groups that have had no 
exposure. 
12. Estimates of annual discharges into the environment are staggeringly high, but imprecise. 
The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) recently found that, of 184 million metric tons of 
air pollution emitted in the United States in 1984, between 4.5 and 24.7 million metric tons may 
have been hazardous chemicals, although no national data are available. Water quality data for 
conventional and toxic pollutants do not indicate what is being discharged, only what industries 
are permitted to discharge. Earlier OTA research determined that between 255 to 275 million 
metric tons of hazardous waste are generated annually - about one ton per citizen. OFFICE OF 
TECHNOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT, SERIOUS REDUCTION OF HAZARDOUS WASTE 152 (1986). See 
also CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, ENVIRONMENT AND HEALTH (1981); infra note 214, con-
cerning the new national inventory of toxic discharges being compiled by the EPA pursuant to 
the EPCRA. 
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cidents or "sudden uncontrolled releases" have become common-
place.13 As production has burgeoned, new chemical measurement 
technologies have revealed the presence of small amounts of toxic and 
potentially toxic substances throughout the environment and popula-
tion.14 For example, numerous suspected carcinogens are found in ur-
ban air and drinking water. 15 In addition, chemical exposures have 
been linked to numerous diseases besides cancer. 16 
Two characteristics of many chemical-related diseases shape the 
basic informational issues in toxicity regulation. First, it appears that 
many diseases may be caused by more than one kind of exposure; rela-
tively few marker or signature symptoms have been identified to con-
nect particular diseases with particular chemicals. Moreover, people 
vary in their susceptibility and their exposure history, although most 
people are now exposed to a variety of chemicals. Second, when low-
level exposures cause a disease, the effect is often not apparent for 
13. See R. Abrams, Toxic Chemical Accidents in New York State: The Risk of Another 
Bhopal 2, A-5 to A-6 (1986) (unpublished report by N.Y. Attorney General citing an average of 
five reported accidents in that state each week from January 1983 through November 1985, many 
involving large companies); T. WHITESIDE, THE PENDULUM AND THE TOXIC CLOUD - THE 
COURSE OF DIOXIN CONTAMINATION (1979). 
14. E.g., Damaged Wildlife Shows Pollution Still Plagues Great Lakes. N.Y. Times, July 12, 
1988, at C4, col. 1. 
15. David P. Rall, Director of the National Institute for Environmental Health Sciences, 
reported in 1979 that "it appears probable that the United States population is exposed to low 
concentrations of many different carcinogens, and that the summation of many low-level chemi-
cal insults yields the current 16-percent death rate from cancer." Rall, Validity of Extrapolation 
of Results of Animal Studies to Man, in PUBLIC CONTROL OF ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH 
HAZARDS 85, 91 (E. Hammond & I. Selikoff eds. 1979). But see Peto, Distorting the Epidemiol-
ogy of Cancer: The Need for a More Balanced Overview, 284 NATURE 297 (Mar. 27, 1980). 
16. Cancer is the second most common cause of death in the United States. In 1983, more 
than 440,000 Americans died of cancer. NATIONAL TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM, U.S. DEPT. OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PUBLIC HEALTH SERV., FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT ON CARCINO-
GENS 5 (1985) [hereinafter FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT ON CARCINOGENS]. A high percentage of 
cancers are now thought to be caused by "environmental factors," but the term "environment" 
in this context means "anything that interacts with humans, including substances eaten, drunk, 
and smoked, natural and medical radiation, workplace exposures, drugs, aspects of sexual behav-
ior and substances in air, water, and soil." Id. The FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT ON CARCINO-
GENS, supra, listed 148 carcinogenic agents; of these, 113 were industrial products or 
occupational exposures, including 13 pesticides, 33 industrial chemicals and by-products, 20 dyes 
and pigments, 14 combustion products, 7 solvents, 6 metals, and 6 analytical and research chemi-
cals. Id. at 3-4. 
Suspected carcinogens comprise a much larger group, but the bases of suspicion vary with the 
data and the authors of the estimates. The National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health 
(NIOSH) is charged with the responsibility oflisting toxic substances. 29 U.S.C. §§ 669(a)(l6), 
669(e), 671 (1982). In 1973, NIOSH listed more than 25,000 entries, involving 11,000 different 
substances. More than 2,400 of these were identified a5 suspected carcinogens. NATIONAL INST. 
FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, SUS-
PECTED CARCINOGENS: A SUBFILE OF THE NIOSH REGISTRY OF TOXIC EFFECTS OF CHEMI-
CAL SUBSTANCES ix (2d ed. 1976). Other lists of suspected carcinogens have also been prepared 
and these vary greatly in length. In addition, while cancer has been the disease of greatest public 
concern, chemical exposures have been linked to other types of health damage, including acute 
toxic effects and neurological problems. See infra notes 40-41, 49. 
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some time. Indeed, some diseases, such as cancer, have latency peri-
ods of several decades. Consequently, the individual causal event 
often passes unnoticed or is, in fact, a series of exposures which are 
relatively unremarkable in themselves. 
Scientists approach the problem by developing statistical estimates 
of the likelihood of causal connections between a chemical and a dis-
ease. They gather data from human populations exposed to a chemi-
cal, particularly in the workplace, to produce epidemiological studies, 
and they subject living cells and animals to exposures in controlled 
laboratory tests. Animal studies are commonly called bioassays. Tox-
icity data can then be used to estimate the health risks posed to 
broader human populations exposed to the same chemical.17 
Both toxicity and exposure data are basic components of health 
risk assessments. 18 The supply of this information guides the course of 
research and chemical regulation and its scarcity shapes the entire sys-
tem. This health data is also used in medical treatment and research, 
government planning and regulation, insurance, industrial hygiene, 
and corporate product development and production. Data is accumu-
lating and our understanding of the biological mechanisms at work in 
disease is growing. However, research on chemical health effects has 
not kept pace with chemical production and dissemination. 
In 1984, the National Research Council of the National Academy 
of Scienc~s issued a report, Toxicity Testing - Strategies to Determine 
Needs and Priorities, 19 evaluating the nation's need for information on 
chemical exposure and its health effects. The Council determined 
that, for the great majority of chemicals, information essential for haz-
ard assessment is lacking. · Of the chemicals sampled by the Council, 
there were adequate data to make a full risk assessment of only 10% of 
pesticides, 2% of cosmeticingredients, 5% of food additives, and 18% 
of drug ingredients.2° For a higher percentage of these materials there 
17. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOV-
ERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS (1983); Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic 
Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J. REG. 89 (1988). See infra notes 56-60 and accompanying text. 
. 18. COMMITTEE ON THE INSTITUTIONAL MEANS FOR AsSESSMENT OF RISKS TO PUBLIC 
HEALTH, COMMN. ON LIFE SCIENCES, NATL. RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK AssESSMENT JN THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS 19-20 (1983) [hereinafter RISK ASSESS· 
MENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT]. 
19. See TOXICITY TESTING, supra note 10, at ix, 19. 
20. See id. at 12.· The study first identified a "select universe" consisting of 65, 725 substances 
that are of possible concern to the National Toxicology Program because of their potential for 
human exposure. Id. at 33. Through a random sampling process, it then selected a subset of 675 
substances covering seven categories. Id. at 43-44. These were (1) pesticides and inert ingredi-
ents; (2) cosmetic ingredients; (3) drugs and excipients; (4) food additives, and three groups of 
chemicals in commerce: (5) those produced in quantities of one million pounds per year or more; 
(6) those produced 'in quantities of fewer than one million pounds per year; and (7) those chemi-
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were at least minimal data available upon which a limited assessment 
could be made: 15% for food additives, 21 % for drugs, 24% for cos-
metics, and 26% for pesticides.21 Most striking was the Council's con-
clusion that no information at all is available on the toxicity of 
approximately 80% of the 48,000 chemical substances in general com-
mercial use. The Council concluded, "Although it can be convinc-
ingly argued that many chemicals do not need to be tested, because of 
their low potential for human exposure or for toxic activity, it is clear 
that thousands or even tens of thousands of chemicals are legitimate 
candidates for toxicity testing related to a variety of health effects."22 
The need for exposure data is also quite acute. The most basic 
exposure data generally have been unavailable or unassembled.23 In 
Toxicity Testing, the National Research Council emphasized that the 
shortage of exposure data is an obstacle to producing adequate toxicity 
cals for which production quantities were unknown. Id. at 38. The seventh category (for which 
there was no information regarding production quantity) was almost as large as categories (5) 
and (6) combined. A subsample of 100 chemicals, about which there was at least some minimal 
toxicity information, was selected and examined in depth to determine the availability of toxicity 
information. Id. at 43-50. 
Another source estimates that fewer than 1 % of the chemicals in routine use have been par-
tially tested and that synergisms are virtually ignored. F. THOMPSON & L. JONES, supra note 8, 
at 213. The inadequacy of available data is routinely ackflowledged by government agencies as a 
condition of and a constraint on regulation. See, e.g., OSHA's Hazard Communication Stan-
dards, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200, app. A (1988). 
21. See TOXICITY TESTING, supra note 10, at 12; CHEMICALS AND HEALTH, supra note 9, at 
87-100. . 
The differences in data supply for drugs, pesticides, and "chemicals in commerce" reflect 
different legal requirements for testing of these groups of chemicals. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301, 342(a), 
348, 355 (1982) (food, drugs, and cosmetics) and 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1982) (pesticides) require ex 
ante testing, while the toxics provisions of environmental and occupational health statutes do 
not. See infra text accompanying notes 87-92 (comparing and explaining ex ante and ex post 
regulation). 
22. TOXICITY TESTING, supra note 10, at 14. The report did not specifically address the 
further problem of identifying effects of exposure to multiple pollutants or to mixtures of pollu-
tants, though the state of present knowledge of cumulative and subadditive effects is quite lim-
ited. See F. THOMPSON & L. JONES, supra note 8, at 213. 
23. TOXICITY TESTING, supra note 10, at 13, 16, 51-53, 73, 123-24. The National Toxicology 
Program publishes an annual report to Congress on carcinogens and exposure to them. In 1985, 
it stated: 
Several problems are encountered in developing the information required for the Annual 
Reports on Carcinogens. Estimating the number of people potentially exposed to a sub-
stance and identifying the nature, route, and intensity of this potential exposure are difficult 
tasks. It is often impossible to obtain accurate production volume and use_patterns for most 
chemicals. 
FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT ON CARCINOGENS, supra note 16, at 1. 
Potential exposure data have generally been drawn from publicly _available descriptions of 
manufacturing processes, general industrial literature, and more recently, reports to regulatory 
agencies. See, e.g., P. BARTH & H. HUNT, WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND WORK RELATED 
ILLNESSES AND .DISEASES 55-60 (1980) (detailing the very rough estimates of exposure relied 
upon by OSHA). Employment duration and job categories are also used as rough measures of 
exposure. See Landrigan, Melius, Rinsky & Thum, Approaches to the Estimation of Exposure in 
Occupational Epidemiology, in BANBURY REPORT 19: RISK QUANTIFICATION AND REGULA-
TORY POLICY 65 (1985). 
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assessments. 24 The report concluded: "In view of the great impor-
tance of exposure data and indexes of hazard assessment and the 
nearly complete absence of such data, the committees recommend that 
planning begin for the development of much more extensive, detailed, 
and accurate data bases than now exist for exposure assessments. "25 
Current data describing which chemicals are being used and where 
they are being used often support only rough estimates.26 Epidemiolo-
gists have repeatedly called for improved linkage of databases and 
records to facilitate exposure estimates. 27 An essential part of such 
linkage is the distribution of chemical identity data.28 
Identification of chemical substances is a precondition to effective 
study of toxics. 29 Chemicals may be closely related in structure and 
24. TOXICITY TESTING, supra note 10, at 124. Several committees of the National Academy 
of Sciences, as well as other health agencies that have surveyed the problem of inadequate toxic-
ity data, have reached a similar conclusion. See, e.g .• RISK AsSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOV· 
ERNMENT, supra note 18, at 150; FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT ON CARCINOGENS, supra note 16, 
at 1-2; INST. OF MEDICINE, NATL. ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, COSTS OF ENVIRONMENT-RE· 
LATED HEALTH EFFECTS: A PLAN FOR CONTINUING STUDY 50 (1981) [hereinafter COSTS 
STUDY]; CHEMICALS AND HEALTH, supra note 9, at 1-2. 
25. TOXICITY TESTING, supra note 10, at 124. 
26. See U.S. EPA Guidelines for Estimating Exposures, 51 Fed. Reg. 34,042, 34,046 (1986) 
[hereinafter Estimating Exposures]; TOXICITY TESTING, supra note 10, at 123. Several kinds of 
information that would be useful in developing exposure data are unavailable. There are great 
variations in the quantities of chemicals produced and the context in which they are used. Some 
have short lifespans in the market (the average is five years). CHEMICALS AND HEALTH, supra 
note 9, at 108. Many are produced in limited quantities, reducing extended exposure but also 
making it difficult to determine toxic effects. Seventy-five percent of all chemicals in production 
in the United States have annual production volumes ofless than 100,000 pounds. LYNDON B. 
JOHNSON SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, POLICY RESEARCH PROJECT No. 50, THE TOXIC SUB· 
STANCES CONTROL ACT: OVERVIEW AND EVALUATION 121 (1982) [hereinafter TSCA: OVER· 
VIEW AND EVALUATION]; see also Hoerger, supra note 9, at 439-40. Annual production volume 
figures are not available for many chemicals in commercial use. There is also a great variation in 
the numbers of people who are exposed to each chemical, the forms of exposure, and the reac· 
tions to exposure. CHEMICALS AND HEALTH, supra note 9, at 27-28. 
The National Research Council's exposure estimates for food, drugs, cosmetics, and pesti-
cides were based on the intended uses of the products. The Council based its environmental and 
occupational exposure estimates on "production volumes, environmental fate, and disposal 
data," but found that "few data of these types were available." TOXICITY TESTING, supra note 
10, at 73. 
27. Where possible chemical exposures are known, the epidemiological study can proceed to 
identify the possible effects from this exposure: 
[W]e have found that it is far more efficient and useful to approach the problem from the 
point of view of exposure. Hence, the name of the game is to first answer the question "To 
what chemicals are members of the population exposed?" and only after this has been an· 
swered, go on to the question of "What effects might we expect from such exposure?". 
Searching for exposures to chemicals of known toxicity may be more dramatic and more fun 
but, in the long run, it is less profitable. 
Fisher, Information Required for Decision Making: Early Warning and Forecasting, in SYMPO· 
SIUM ON THE HANDLING OF TOXICOLOGICAL INFORMATION 148, 149 (1976). 
28. See infra Part IV. 
29. Chemical identity is the starting point for any activity that evaluates chemical health 
effects. See, e.g., Estimating Exposures, supra note 26, at 34,042, 34,046; U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH 
& HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM: REVIEW OF CURRENT DHHS, DOE, 
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yet have very different health impacts. 3° For instance, benzene and 
toluene are very similar in molecular structure, but only benzene has 
been shown to cause leukemia in humans. Disclosure of chemical 
identity is the starting point for establishing the fact of exposure and 
determining and preventing adverse effects. 
Recognizing the need to identify and study chemicals' health im-
pact, Congress enacted the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) in 
1976.31 The TSCA directs the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) to maintain an inventory of all chemicals in use and to screen 
new chemicals for risks before they enter the environment. In 1978, 
the National Toxicology Program (NTP) was established within the 
Department of Health and Human Services to coordinate federal toxi-
cological research.32 And in 1980, the Agency for Toxic Substances 
Disease Registry (ATSDR) was mandated by the Comprehensive En-
vironmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) 
to manage data related to hazardous waste sites. 33 Additional author-
ity and appropriations for study are scattered throughout the statutory 
scheme; but these legislative responses, discussed more fully below, 
have not produced data at a satisfactory rate. 
While the government and the private sector produce data, the 
management and distribution expenditures of both are difficult to 
quantify.34 In fiscal year 1987, the federal government allocated $210 
AND EPA RESEARCH RELATED TO TOXICOLOGY, FISCAL YEAR 1987 (toxicology testing organ-
ized by chemical name and CAS number) [hereinafter NATIONAL TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM: RE-
VIEW]; TOXICITY TESTING, supra note 10, at 185, 191; OSHA Proposed Hazard Communication 
Rules, 47 Fed. Reg. 12,092, 12,105 (1982) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910) (proposed Mar. 
19, 1982) (identity information is an essential element in a hazard communication system). 
Collection and coordination of data is an increasingly important dimension of regulation, see 
infra text accompanying note 171. Several toxics data coordination schemes, including the Inter-
agency Toxic Substances Data Committee and the Chemical Substances Information Network, 
are described in LAYMAN'S GUIDE, supra note 10, at 9. See also COSTS STUDY, supra note 24, at 
37-38 (describing federal information systems and data related to environmental hazards and 
human exposure); TOXIC CHEMICALS AND PUBLIC PROTECTION: A REPORT TO THE PRESI-
DENT BY THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES STRATEGY COMMITTEE 21-33 (1980) [hereinafter TOXIC 
CHEMICALS AND PUBLIC PROTECTION]. . 
30. TSCA: OVERVIEW AND EVALUATION, supra note 26, at 47-48. 
31. 15 u.s.c. § 2601 (1982). 
32. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL TOXICOLOGICAL PROGRAM: 
FISCAL YEAR 1987 ANNUAL PLAN 1 (1987). See generally NATIONAL TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM: 
REVIEW, supra note 29. 
33. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9061, 9064(i) (1982). The agency began to operate only in 1983. 
34. NATIONAL TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM: REVIEW, supra note 29, at 4, reports that $156 
million was allocated to chemical testing and $54 million to toxicological methods development. 
In 1980, the NTP budget was $65.7 million and in 1988 it was $79.1 million (or $48 million in 
1980 dollars). For fiscal year 1972, the President's Science Advisory Committee reported that 
the federal effort in environmental health research amounted to $98 million, not counting re-
search on biological disease agents and on ionizing and electromagnetic radiation. CHEMICALS 
AND HEALTH, supra note 9, at 88. 
State spending on scientific research in general is considerably less than federal spending. In 
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million for toxicological research, but in real dollars, the budget for 
chemical testing was smaller than the 1980 budget.35 The benefits of 
these expenditures are limited further by the fact that most govern-
ment data management has been conducted within individual agencies 
with limited data distribution.36 Figures on private research expendi-
tures are hard to come by, and the National Research Council found 
little private data available to assist it in preparing its 1984 report.37 
Moreover, much private data held by the government is treated as 
confidential and was not released to the Council. 38 The Council noted 
that this private data, therefore, "did not exist" for purposes of toxic-
ity screening. 39 
Present levels of data production are insufficient to meet the needs 
of a variety of uses. For instance, because of the absence of informa-
tion about chemical exposures that might otherwise explain symp-
toms, doctors may have to use risky or harmful diagnostic procedures 
and remedies. Dr. James Robins, of the Harvard School of Public 
Health, has described examples of the difficulties faced by occupa-
tional health professionals in treating their patients: 
I saw a worker with severe progressive lung disease ... caused by beryl-
lium metal or a non-work-related disease called sarcoidosis. If beryllium 
fiscal year 1977, the states together spent $600 million on all research and development; federal 
expenditures were more than $20 billion. NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, RESEARCH AND 
DEVELOPMENT IN STATE AND LoCAL GOVERNMENTS, FISCAL YEAR 1977, DETAILED STATIS· 
TICAL TABLES 1 (1978); U.S. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, SPECIAL ANALYSES: 
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 1978, at 306. 
Private sector research conducted by individual companies is especially difficult to quantify. 
Some research has been supported on a cooperative basis. The Chemical Industry Institute of 
Toxicology was formed in 1974 by 36 companies. In 1983, it had a budget of approximately $10 
million and had conducted long-term studies on eight chemicals and was working on seven 
others. See Hoerger, Beamer & Hanson, The Cumulative Impact of Health, Environmental, and 
Safety Concerns on the Chemical Industry During the Seventies, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 59, 
73-74 (Summer 1983) (describing several joint industry research projects). 
35. See supra note 34. The number of new toxicity and carcinogenicity starts has also de-
creased, from 40 prechronic and 44 carcinogenicity studies started in 1980 to 28 prechronic and 
10 carcinogenicity studies started in 1988. See Letter to the author from Ernest E. McConnell, 
D.V.M., National Inst. of Envtl. Health Sciences (July l, 1988) (on file with the Michigan Law 
Review) [hereinafter McConnell Letter]. 
36. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AssESSMENT, INFORMING THE NATION: FEDERAL INFORMA• 
...,.,TION DISSEMINATION IN AN ELECTRONIC AGE 29 (1988) [hereinafter INFORMING THE 
NATION). 
37. See supra note 34. The authors of Toxicity Testing sought the assistance of firms and 
trade associations in a health assessment of 40 chemicals in commerce selected for study, but 
received only partial responses. The industry information which was secured was largely organ-
ized in a way that made it difficult to retrieve pertinent data. TOXICITY TESTING, supra note 10, 
at 194-96. When private research and development figures are publicly available, research on 
substance side effects is typically not separated from total research and development. See CHEM· 
ICALS AND HEALTH, supra note 9, at 89-90. 
38. See infra note 217 and accompanying text (discussing protection of trade secrets). 
39. TOXICITY TESTING, supra note 10, at 53. 
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was the cause, the proper treatment was removal from further exposure 
while, on the other hand, the treatment for sarcoidosis was corticoste-
roids. Corticosteroid treatment is associated with potentially severe side 
effects including diabetes, cataracts, fractured bones, and infections. 
Thus it was medically necessary to know whether the worker had been 
exposed to beryllium at work. But in the absence of a right-to-know law, 
I was unable to obtain this information from an uncooperative employer 
fearful of a compensation suit. As a consequence the worker had to un-
dergo a painful and potentially dangerous operation to remove a piece of 
lung for beryllium analysis.40 
Medical research and reporting also rely upon identifying the nature 
of chemical exposures.41 The links between the causes of occupational 
disease and disease in the broader community can only be established 
or studied if better information is available.42 One of the early steps of 
epidemiological studies, the phase in which an "informed hunch" de-
velops, is often handicapped by poor identification of the class of per-
sons exposed to specific chemicals. 43 The lack of information also 
40. Testimony of James Robins, M.D., before the Massachusetts Joint Committee on Health 
Care, Mar. 9, 1983. In the same testimony, Dr. Robins reports another story: 
As another example, a patient was seen with fever and a chest X-ray sugg~ting pneumo-
nia. The patient had been cutting barrels containing an unknown substance with a blow 
torch prior to becoming ill. The worker knew only the trade name on the barrel label. We 
were unable to track down the generic chemical name in a prompt manner. Therefore an-
tibiotics were administered because it was felt that the patient had typical pneumonia caused 
by bacteria. Later, after much leg work, we discovered that the barrel had contained a 
teflon-like compound that was known to cause a pneumonia-like illness when heated. Thus, 
antibiotics had been improper treatment. · 
Dr. Robins has estimated that more than half of the time spent by occupational health profes-
sionals evaluating patients suspected of being ill from chemical exposure is pevoted to tracking 
down the names of chemicals for which the worker can give only a brand name. Id. 
41. Medical diagnosis of chemical diseases may be made difficult or impossible because of an 
inability to connect symptoms with chemical exposures. For example, 
[i]n the Vesicol Chemical plant in Bayport, Texas ... workers were being exposed to a 
number of neurotoxic agents, including a highly hazardous pesticide called Leptophos. Var-
ious workers had experienced neurological symptoms and sought treatment from their per-
sonal physicians. A number of them were independently diagnosed as having encephalitis 
or multiple sclerosis because their symptoms and clinical examinations were thought to be 
consistent with these disorders. According to NIOSH investigators, there are subtle differ-
ences in the symptoms and type of nerve damage resulting from pesticide poisoning rather 
than these diseases, but encephalitis and multiple sclerosis could mimic those caused by 
neurotoxic chemicals encountered in the workplace. Since the sick workers had been seen 
by different physicians who may not have been able to elicit a good occupational history, 
and since appropriate toxicological information about the relevant workplace chemicals 
might not have been immediately available to the attending physicians, it is not surprising 
that the diagnosis of encephalitis or multiple sclerosis was considered rather than pesticide 
poisoning. 
OSHA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS AND REGULA-
TORY FLEXIBILITY ANALYSIS OF THE HAZARD COMMUNICATION STANDARD, at 11-24 (1983) 
[hereinafter FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS]; see also P. BARTH & H. HUNT, supra 
note 23, at 86-89. 
42. Davis, Bridbord & Schneiderman, supra note 11, at 296, point out that for many work-
place exposures, there is no way to identify an unexposed control group because the chemicals 
are present in products and environmental pollution to which the general population is also 
exposed. 
43. See, e.g., Austin, An Industry-Sponsored Mortality Surveillance Program, in BANBURY 
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means that chemically related diseases are likely to be under-
reported. 44 
The costs of the lack of this information are often ignored because 
concepts of the value of information are not incorporated into deci-
sionmaking. 45 Among these costs are the prevention of pollution 
treatment, cure, convalescence, and rehabilitation; costs attributable to 
pain and suffering; loss of income on future earnings; adverse effects 
on productivity; loss of tax revenues resulting from decreases in earn-
ings and productivity; costs to welfare and unemployment compensa-
tion systems and government programs of health benefits; and other 
related direct and indirect costs.46 The National Academy of Sciences 
Institute of Medicine has identified some indirect and related costs. 
These include nonhealth sector costs, direct costs borne by individuals 
and their families (e.g., relocating, household help, special diet and 
physical care, counseling), and losses from depressed value of property 
damaged by pollution. 47 
Toxicity and exposure data thus have numerous scientific, medical, 
and economic uses. The government uses this information to set expo-
sure standards and to assess the benefits of regulation. The lack of 
REPORT 9, supra note 9, at 347; Beebe, Record Linkage and Needed Improvements in Existing 
Data Resources, in BANBURY REPORT 9, supra note 9, at 661; Hoar, Epidemiology and Occupa-
tional Classification Systems, in BANBURY REPORT 9, supra note 9, at 455. Epidemiologists are 
particularly constrained by lack of exposure data. S. EPSTEIN, POLITICS OF CANCER 41 (1978). 
44. Only two to three percent of all workers' compensation payments are made for occupa-
tional illness, and one third of these are for minor ailments, such as skin rashes. Schroeder & 
Shapiro, supra note 4. The 1980 Bureau of Labor Statistics Supplementary Data System noted 
only 234 workers' compensation awards for cancer. This figure contrasts sharply with estimates 
for asbestos-related cancers, which alone range from 4000 to 12,000 per year. 
Another factor that compounds this difficulty is that most doctors have not been educated on 
chemical risks, although the percentage has been rapidly increasing. See Levy, The Teaching of 
Occupational Health in United States Medical Schools: Five Year Follow-Up of an Initial Survey, 
75 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 79, 79-80 (1985). The National Academy of Sciences' Institute of 
Medicine recently reported that most family doctors are inadequately trained to recognize and 
treat illnesses that stem from unhealthy home or work environments. Gap Found in Averting 
Workplace Diseases, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1988, at Cl2, col. 4. 
45. See TOXICITY TESTING, supra note IO, at 295-96. Much publicly supported toxicity re-
search has not been specifically aimed at producing data immediately useful to decisionmakers. 
As the National Research Council has noted, "[t]he concept of the value of information is an 
important contribution to systematic priority-setting .... [T]he 'cost' of not knowing the degree 
of toxicity of a chemical (or the degree of human exposure to it) lies in misclassifying its hazard 
- e.g., believing it is innocuous, when it is actually toxic." To XI CITY TESrING, supra note 10, at 
15. 
In Appendix E to its report, the Council explores the ramifications of an error of judgment as 
to toxicity of a substance. It concludes that the costs of underestimating toxicity are likely to be 
greater than the costs of overestimating and establishing regulatory controls. See TOXICITY 
TESrING, supra note 10, app. at 363-79 ("The Costs of Misclassification"). 
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-96 (1982). See generally Health Services Research, Health Statistics, 
and Health Care Technology Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-623, 92 Stat. 3443 (codified in scat-
tered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
47. See generally COSTS STUDY, supra note 24. 
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solid information undermines the credibility of the government's risk 
assessments and makes it difficult for consumers or employers to make 
intelligent and informed decisions.48 Insurers, employers, and unions 
can also use exposure and toxicity data to reduce liability and occupa-
tional health problems.49 Consumers and consumer service organiza-
tions could use the information to evaluate products, if it were 
available in sufficient quantity and in appropriate format. 
Once the information is collected, it has the characteristics of a 
"public good": that is, it becomes a good whose consumption by one 
user does not diminish its availability or benefit to any other user. 
Also, it can be transferred relatively easily and used in a variety of 
contexts. This flexibility means that it can be very productive at a low 
marginal cost, once the initial investment is made. 50 
While there is disagreement over the adequacy of our current level 
of investment in toxicity data collection, there is a consensus that the 
48. One reason for the success of EP A's lead phase-down program under the Clean Air Act, 
in spite of intense industry and OMB opposition, was that the estimated population exposure 
used "real information." School systems and local public health boards had accumulated very 
substantial records of exposure to lead, using regular school blood tests. 
49. Chemical awareness and information could have prevented the following incident: 
On August 20, 1975, Ted Phillips died while working in an unventilated pit. The employer 
had given him a bucket of solvent from a drum labeled only with the trade name "ax-
othene." Several hours after Ted Phillips entered the pit, the foreman went to look for him 
and found his body. "Axothene" is methyl chloroform, which in high concentrations causes 
dizziness, unconsciousness, and eventual death. It can also trigger heart attack by interfer-
ing with the system controlling the heartbeat. Apparently, Ted Phillips became dizzy and 
spilled the solvent. Not knowing the danger he was in, he got a second bucket and reentered 
the pit. Methyl chloroform evaporates quickly; the concentration in the pit was fatal. 
FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 41, at II-24. 
Some "downstream" manufacturers, who purchase chemicals to use in their production 
processes, have been vocal in supporting dissemination of chemical identity and health effects 
data. Both downstream employers and unions participating in OSHA's hazard communication 
rulemaking proceeding generally opposed strict protective measures for trade secrets, questioning 
the seriousness of the economic threat posed by access to them. For example, a representative of 
the American Paper Institute stated: 
A manufacturer should not be allowed to withhold the chemical identity of any chemical 
which "contributes substantially" to the hazards of a mixture and for which there is a need 
to know the specific chemical identity in order to provide a safe workplace. Downstream 
employers, for example, may need to know the specific chemical identity of an ingredient in 
order to monitor the level of airborne contaminants. 
American Paper Inst., Exhibit 1973, 48 Fed. Reg. 53,313 (1983). A representative of the Cater-
pillar Tractor Company stated: 
We feel that the latitude provided chemical manufacturers in identifying most chemicals 
by the broad generic chemical classification will substantially hinder the efforts of safety and 
health professionals to determine the requirements for safe usage of specific products .... 
We feel the benefits to be derived in fully disclosing the constituents of a hazardous material 
far outweigh the risk (real or imagined) that may be incurred by chemical manufacturers as 
a result of disclosing this information. 
Caterpillar Tractor Co., Exhibit 19-201, 48 Fed. Reg. 53,313 (1983). 
50. See Barry & Hardin, Introduction, in RATIONAL MAN AND IRRATIONAL SOCIETY? 181 
(B. Barry & R. Hardin eds. 1982). Technical information, like any technical good, is rendered 
more useful and more flexible if it is enhanced by combination and interpretation. 
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data are useful. Since this illformation has many useful applications, 
why does the market not produce it? 
II. DISINCENTIVES TO DATA PRODUCTION 
The market for chemicals will not produce and distribute data on 
toxicity and exposure unless an incentive structure is developed and 
maintained. Several factors work to prevent the current system from 
providing such incentives. 
The dearth of toxicity data is in part due to the "public good" 
nature of the information.51 The virtues of flexibility and ease of 
transfer that characterize public goods become liabilities in commerce, 
because public goods cannot easily be held for exclusive use. If only 
one person "buys" the information, others may still benefit; the costs 
of producing the data cannot be recouped by multiple individual sales. 
Because public goods are difficult to own and to control, the market 
produces them at lower levels than may be desirable. 
Information is an especially problematic public good, because pur-
chasers do not know its value until it has been acquired. 52 Research is 
affected by this dynamic. It is also a risky investment because one 
cannot know ahead of time whether the effort will yield anything of 
value. In spite of these handicaps, research and development are tra-
ditionally a major area of investment. Private research has been sup-
ported by legal protections, such as copyright and patent law. 
Cost-reducing inventions are one kind of information likely to be 
produced privately. But toxicological data has a less ready marketa-
bility than many cost-saving inventions. It has value only to those 
who bear the costs that it reduces. Since even the individual victims of 
chemical-related disease can rarely identify its specific cause, little de-
mand has developed for assurance of safe or low-risk chemical 
products. 53 
A further disincentive to private research is the fact that the infor-
mation produced is often inexact. Toxicologists currently have three 
basic tools with which to gather data: laboratory cell analyses, bioas-
51. See Barry & Hardin, Individual Actions and Collective Consequences, in RATIONAL MAN 
AND IRRATIONAL SOCIETY?, supra note 50, at 31-33; Joskow & Noll, supra note 8, at 26; F. 
MACHLUP, THE PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE UNITED STATES 28 
(1962) ("The production of knowledge is, for the greater part, not guided by the market 
mechanism."). 
52. See Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE 
RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609, 615 (1962). 
53. See P. Landrigan & S. Markowitz, Occupational Disease in New York State 17 (Feb. 
1987) (Report to N.Y. State Legislature) ("workers often are not aware of or cannot remember 
their exposure to dangerous materials"). 
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says, and epidemiology. Each has strengths and weaknesses that sup-
port different levels of confidence in their results. 
The cheapest and easiest methodology is laboratory analysis of the 
effects of a chemical on the DNA of cell cultures or on bacteria, yeast, 
or fruit fiies.s4 If a chemical causes a change in a cell's DNA, it is 
considered a mutagen. However, while mutagenicity and carcinoge-
nicity are statistically related, this kind of test is not reliable enough to 
provide a basis for human exposure decisions. ss 
The bioassay is the most controversial tool of toxicologists. Proto-
cols for laboratory testing for carcinogenicity establish procedures for 
exposing animals to controlled high doses of chemicals, but the appli-
cation of animal test data to humans has been the center of heated 
debate over the validity of inferences drawn from these studies. s6 So 
far, accumulating test experience demonstrates that most chemicals 
proved by epidemiological studies to be human carcinogens also cause 
cancer in animals.s7 However, the reverse is not clear: since human 
data is available for few chemicals, only limited confirmation of animal 
test results is possible. ss 
54. See COSTS STUDY, supra note 24, at 51. 
55. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AsSESSMENT, IDENTIFYING AND REGULATING CARCINO-
GENS 164-66 (1987) [hereinafter REGULATING CARCINOGENS]; see also Ames, Identifying Envi-
ronmental Chemicals Causing Mutations and Cancer, 204 SCIENCE 587 (1979). Laboratory cell 
analysis is often cited as the type of methodological breakthrough necessary to cope with screen-
ing the large number of untested chemicals. Research on basic cell functions includes NIEHS 
work in the role of oncogenes in the carcinogenesis process. New developments in understanding 
the disease process will speed toxicity screening, but the outcome of this research is still uncer-
tain. Allison, Current Trends in Toxicological Research, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST INTER-
NATIONAL CONGRESS ON TOXICOLOGY: TOXICOLOGY AS A PREDICTIVE SCIENCE 387 (G. PJaa 
& w. Duncan eds. 1978) [hereinafter TOXICOLOGY AS A PREDICTIVE SCIENCE]. Even if speedy, 
inexpensive screening devices were available, exposure data would still be necessary. TOXICITY 
TESTING, supra note 10, at 7. 
56. See e.g., Health Effects Testing Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 798.1100 (1987); see also Rall, 
Validity of Extrapolation of Results of Animal Studies to Man, in PUBLIC CONTROL OF ENVI-
RONMENTAL HEALTH HAZARDS, supra note 15, at 85 passim (arguing that animal test data 
apply to humans). But see Breslow, Comment: Risk Assessment: Science or Policy?, 3 STAT. Sci. 
28 (Feb. 1988); Freedman & Zeise!, From Mouse-to-Man: The Quantitative Assessment of Cancer 
Risks, 3 STAT. SCI. 3 (Feb. 1988). . 
57. S. EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 59. 
58. Therefore, we do not have a firm sense of the extent to which animal tests may be under-
estimating or overestimating disease for humans. Samuel Epstein notes that few epidemiological 
studies have been done on substances found to be carcinogens in rodents. The Jack of this partic-
ular type of data is sometimes spoken of as evidence of noncarcinogenicity in humans. Some 
industry representatives have argued that regulation should primarily, if not exclusively, be di-
rected at the few carcinogens identified by human epidemiologic studies. Epstein cites a reductio 
ad absurdum put forward by Vaun Newill, Medical Director of Exxon Corporation: 
A regulatory program based on experimental screening models to evaluate new chemicals 
prior to their introduction into the environment, however, will hinder the better documenta-
tion of this correlation [between human and animal carcinogenicity data] than we have pres-
ently. When a carcinogen is prevented from entering the environment on the basis of 
screening results, there can be no data regarding that exposure in man. 
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Epidemiology is the science of statistical correlation of human ex-
posure and disease symptoms to indicate the prevalence of disease in 
an exposed group. 59 Epidemiologists most often study industrial 
workplace settings, in an effort to get a focused look at more intensive 
levels of exposure than occur in the general population. 60 But even in 
work settings, epidemiological data suffer from many confounding fac-
tors, including multiple exposures, undetermined exposures, and poor 
record-keeping. 61 Also, the latency periods of some diseases are 
twenty years or more, longer than many chemicals have been in use. 62 
However, while it is of limited sensitivity and cannot easily detect low 
incidences of disease, epidemiology may confirm human carcin-
ogenicity. 63 
Epidemiological studies and bioassays are both costly. 64 More-
over, the cost of an individual bioassay has risen dramatically during 
the past decade. 65 Firms will be reluctant to make substantial invest-
s. EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 59 (quoting 29 CANCER BULLETIN 177-78 (1977)); see also REGU-
LATING CARCINOGENS, supra note 55, at 166-67. 
59. See E. CALABRESE, METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO DERIVING ENVIRONMENTAL 
AND OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH STANDARDS 4 (1978); G. FRIEDMAN, PRIMER OF EPIDEMIOL-
OGY 8-10 (1980); A. LILIENFELD, FOUNDATIONS OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 13 (1976). For surveys of 
the results of recent epidemiological work, see Davis, Bridbord & Schneiderman, supra note 11, 
at 290-91; Selikolf, Constraints in Estimating Occupational Contributions to Current Cancer Mor-
tality in the United States, in BANBURY REPORT 9, supra note 9, at 4. 
60. For many diseases there is currently no way to single out one cause and link it with an 
effect. While some substances, such as DES, have been linked with a particular symptom or set 
of symptoms shown not to be caused by other exposures, many diseases are not so easily catego-
rized. Often the only possible linkages will be demonstrations of increased statistical incidences 
in exposed human populations, but these may not show up for low levels of exposures. 
61. See J. HIGHLAND, M. FINE & R. BOYLE, MALIGNANT NEGLECT 48 (1979). 
62. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910, 2000 app. B; P. BARTH & H. HUNT, supra note 23, at 62-70; S. 
EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 58 passim; Davis, Bridbord & Schneiderman, supra note 11, at 293-94; 
Muir, Limitations and Advantages of Epidemiological Investigations in Environmental Carcino-
genesis, in PUBLIC CONTROL OF ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH HAZARDS, supra note 15, at 153, 
159-60; Selikoff, supra note 59, at 3, 5. 
63. Renschler, Introductory Remarks, in TOXICOLOGY AS A PREDICTIVE SCIENCE, supra 
note 55, at 221. · 
64. The costs of study vary with the methodology and the chemical. Thus, while the Na-
tional Research Council cited the figure "up to a million dollars" as the cost for laboratory study 
of a single chemical, it also recommended establishing priorities on "which chemicals to test and 
which tests to perform." TOXICITY TESTING, supra note 10, at 14, 199-295. Several studies have 
estimated costs on a more refined basis, with more specific estimates tied to types of testing. Cost 
estimates vary depending on the type of testing. "Biodegradation tests, for example, cost in the 
neighborhood of $5,000 to $12,000 to perform, while subchronic health tests may cost $100,000 
or more and chronic toxicity and oncogenicity studies may cost $300,000 to $700,000." TSCA: 
OVERVIEW AND EVALUATION, supra note 26, at 121. See also Portney, Toxic Substance Policy 
and the Protection of Human Health, in CURRENT ISSUES JN U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 136 
(1978) (estimating that the standard laboratory tests necessary to determine the toxicity of a 
single chemical cost from $200,000 to $750,000). The cost of epidemiology is harder to estimate 
because of the variety of study designs. Cf COSTS STUDY, supra note 24, at app. E-1. 
65. The rising cost of bioassays is due in part to inflation and in part to the fact that a wide 
spectrum of toxic insults and effects is now the subject of each bioassay. Also, quality assurance 
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ments in research that produces uncertain health data, instead of new 
products. 66 
Of course, the price of toxicological knowledge cannot be under-
stood as a simple function of the expense of conducting individual 
studies. Toxicological research as a social enterprise has produced a 
substantial amount of health information in a relatively short span of 
time, and as the field matures, it is developing new methodologies. A 
developed and accessible database on chemical characteristics is itself 
a powerful research tool. 67 Also, as toxicology identifies sources of 
disease, it fills out the cost-benefit equation: it identifies the externali-
ties of chemical toxicity. In addition, it may allow for continued use 
of a chemical by making possible preventive medicine and by reducing 
the cost to society of using the chemical. 68 Unfortunately, these bene-
fits may not be recovered by individual firms, or their impact may not 
be easily identifiable as the results of one company's research. Thus, 
firms are unlikely to undertake costly testing, because the benefits are 
public and cumulative and not reflected in the corporate balance sheet. 
Toxicological data collection is beyond the reach of the individual and 
is a problematic investment for firms. 
Another important influence on data production is the simple fact 
that toxicity and exposure are negative features of chemical products. 
As long as no way exists for buyers to identify the toxic effects of 
specific chemicals, there is no commercial incentive for chemical pro-
ducers to identify and publicize them. 69 -Sellers will not willingly re-
veal negative characteristics of their products. 7° Comprehensive and 
accessible toxicity rating systems would support affirmative advertis-
methods have been instituted. In 1980, the primary concern was to determine the target organs 
of toxicity and whether or not the chemical was a carcinogen. Thus the price range for bioassays 
in 1980 was $150,000 to $1.1 million; today, it is $470,000 to $2.9 million. McConnell Letter, 
supra note 35. , 
66. Whether or not firms can afford to conduct bioassays is a separate question. In 1978 
Samuel Epstein estimated that annual costs for testing the 700 chemicals that reach commerce 
annually, at $200,000 each, would be .2% of the 1975 gross sales of the chemical industry, or 
$140 million of its $5.5 billion after-tax profits. S. EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 72-73. 
67. See infra Part IV. 
68. See Hodgson, Social and Economic Implications of Cancer in the !fnited States, in MAN-
AGEMENT OF AsSESSED RISK, supra note 5, at 189 {discussing the economic costs of cancer). 
69. TOXICITY TESTING, supra note 10, at 124 ("There is little incentive for voluntary report-
ing of either production or exposure data in the open literature or in accessible agency files, and 
the few data available are often reported in forms that limit their comparability.'!). 
70. Latin points out that producers are not always in the best position to know the effects of 
their products, even though they know the products' components. See Latin, Environmental 
Uncertainty, supra note 4, at 218. However, there are also strong commercial influences in favor 
of data manipulation. Where firms have market power, they may have incentives to exploit or 
even create uncertainty or imperfect information. See Beales, Craswell & Salop, The Efficient 
Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J. L. & EcoN. 491, 507-09 (1981); Nelson, Information 
and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. PoL. EcoN. 311 (1970); Rothschild, Models of Market Organiza-
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ing, but without a developed information context, there is no incentive 
to study a chemical: the long-term health effects remain invisible for 
one's own products and for those of one's competitors. 
A series of market dysfunctions arises from these factors.71 The 
invisibility of chemical toxicity has destructive effects on the market 
for chemicals. If product quality cannot be gauged by consumers, the 
overall quality of products in the market will be affected. Buyers' in-
ability to screen products removes any incentive for manufacturers to 
differentiate between toxic and nontoxic products and to screen before 
production. The result is a higher overall level of toxicity in products 
than would result if toxicity were a visible characteristic. Chemical 
products with lower toxicity will be penalized by the presence in the 
market of some unknown number of toxics. 
Indeed, as long as the information market remains undeveloped, 
ignorance of toxicity may be an advantage to a product. New or un-
studied chemicals will do better in relation to chemicals that have been 
shown to have some indication of toxicity. Ignorance will tend to 
prevail.72 
tion with Imperfect Information: A Survey, 81 J. PoL. EcoN. 1283, 1289-301 (1973); Salop, Infor-
mation and Monopolistic Competition, 66 AM. EcoN. REV. 240 (1976). 
71. In his paper, The Economics of Information, 69 J. PoL. ECON. 213 (1961), George Stigler 
proposed to factor into economic analysis the costs of a search for information. He pointed out, 
for instance, that price dispersion is a measure of ignorance about prices. Id. at 214. Stigler's 
proposed model of how a search proceeds has been criticized. See Rothschild, supra note 70, at 
1286-89. But search costs are now a standard notion in economic analysis: 
Whenever market participants lack information, there is a potential for reduced efficiency 
and distributional damage (however defined). If workers are unaware of more advantageous 
employment possibilities, labor markets will not allocate labor efficiently. If investors are 
unaware of potentially profitable investments, capital markets will not allocate capital effi-
ciently. If consumers are unaware of better purchase opportunities or the characteristics of 
the goods they purchase, markets will not guide production efficiently. When public goods 
and externalities distort the informational content of relative prices, aggregated decisions 
will not allocate resources efficiently. All of the above distortions and deviations created by 
insufficient information also create a pattern of income gains and losses for different partici-
pants relative to perfectly functioning markets. 
R. BARTLETI & u. APTE, supra note 8, at 22. 
72. This dynamic is illustrated by economist George Akerlof's simplified model of the used 
car market. When cars are new, neither the seller nor the buyer will know if a given car is a 
lemon. Therefore, there is a risk of getting a lemon, yet the buyer will pay the same price because 
she cannot tell the difference. The problem intensifies, however, in the used car market. Good 
cars are less likely to be traded or sold, leaving lemons to make up a relatively larger share of the 
used car market. This will deflate the price of used cars generally and force good cars off the 
market because sellers cannot get full value, making it a market for lemons. The effect is analo-
gous in a field of chemical products, though the parallel is inexact. There is no advantage to 
manufacturers in producing chemical products with demonstrated nontoxicity and incurring the 
expense of testing, because products cannot be told apart on this basis anyway, given the invisi-
bility of toxicity. See Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons'~· Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q. J. EcoN. 488 (1970) (discussing implications of buyers' limited ability to judge 
the quality of products of varying grades); Wilson, The Nature of Equilibrium in Markets with 
Adverse Selection, 11 BELL J. EcoN. 108 (1980). The basic incentive to maintain a level of igno-
rance about toxicity may be enhanced where the producing sector is concentrated, as it is in parts 
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While normal market responses to the dysfunctions described here 
include advertising, pooling of buyer resources, and development of 
third-party information providers and product rating services, 73 none 
of these can develop without accessible chemical identity data. A fun-
damental information asymmetry in the chemicals market is created 
by the fact that the chemical producer knows what the chemical is,' 
while the buyer often does not. Without the chemical identity of the 
product, the buyer cannot seek assistance in developing information 
independently. 74 Chemical manufacturers can be thought of as free 
riders in this context, "riding" on consumer ignorance: they benefit by 
not providing toxicity data, at the expense of consumer uncertainty 
and injury. Absent regulation, the information is likely to remain un-
disclosed and unexamined, since the interests of its holders are adverse 
to those of the beneficiaries of disclosure. 
Furthermore, when toxicity data is produced privately, for exam-
ple in response to regulation, market incentives may detract from its 
quality. Producers tie information production to the product's budget. 
The result may be a cheaper grade, lower quality product and a cheap 
grade of information. 75 Thus, while valuable information has been 
produceq by industry sources, particularly under statutory schemes 
which require ex ante registration of chemical products, its volume 
and its quality have been affected by the constraints of the commercial 
of the synthetic chemicals industry. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. 
Supp. 740, 828 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). 
73. Stigler notes that advertising and the development of specialized traders are obvious re-
sponses to high search costs. Stigler, supra note 71, at 216-17. Akerlof notes that guarantees, 
brand name goods, and licenses are responses to situations in which product quality 'is obscure to 
the consumer. Akerlof, supra note 72, at 499-500. Salop suggests that advertising, which is 
costly for the firm, may also complicate the consumer's search. Salop, supra note 70, at 244. 
74. Normally, purchasers may bargain for data. However, in the chemicals context, the 
data's invisibility and complexity and the lack of accessible assistance in' managing it have dis-
couraged this approach. Beales, Craswell & Salop point out that "consumers may underestimate 
the value of additional information simply because they lack other data that would tell them of 
their need to learn more." Beales, Craswell & Salop, supra note 70, at 491, 506. Market-based 
obstacles to workers' access and use of data about occupational disease are also discussed by 
Schroeder & Shapiro, supra note 4, at 1237-44. They note that the existing general lack of infor-
mation discourages individuals and unions from bargaining for occupational health information 
and tangible preventive measures. See also O'Reilly, Driving a Soft Bargain: Unions, Toxic 
Materials, and Right to Know Legislation, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 307 (1985) (discussing why 
unions infrequently bargain with management for chemical data). 
75. See Oi, The Economics of Product Safety, 4 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3, 5-19 (1973). 
Oi assumes that producers are liable for the injuries of consumers, but they have no mechanism 
to lessen the damage costs of individual consumers; consumers are assumed to have perfect infor-
mation about product risks, to know their expected damage costs, and to be able to obtain inex-
pensive, actuarially fair insurance. On these assumptions, producer liability leads to an 
inefficient outcome because producers essentially must bear the costs of the product and an insur-
ance policy for heterogeneous consumers. Strict consumer liability allows the consumer to 
purchase separately the optimal quality of product and the optimal insurance policy. The 
model's assumptions identify the elements of the information problem. 
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context.76 
Even when privately produced information is of high quality, the 
commercial context diminishes its credibility and, thus, its value.77 In-
formation that is complex and easily manipulable will be particularly 
undervalued, unless it can be independently corroborated. Indeed, de-
ception certainly occurs and is often perceived as widespread. These 
factors limit the usefulness of toxicity data generated by private chemi-
cal producers. 1s 
The market disincentives to production and obstacles to indepen-
dent evaluation of private data make public intervention necessary to 
ensure that accurate data are produced and distributed optimally. In-
76. See Shapiro, Divorcing Profit Motivation from New Drug Research: A Consolidation of 
Proposals to Provide the FDA with Reliable Test Data, 1978 DUKE L.J. 155, 161-68 (citing evi-
dence that drug manufacturers' safety research is influenced by the profit motive and that con· 
tractual commercial relationships between researchers and drug sponsors are themselves a strong 
influence on the quality of data). 
77. Viscusi suggests that, because the value of information often cannot be known before it is 
purchased, information that is cheap or free in a competitive marketplace will be viewed by 
recipients as having little value .. Indeed, he maintains that much information that is now pro· 
vided to workers is not intended to enable them to assess risks more accurately, but to lower their 
assessment of their risks. "The most widespread claim by firms is that National Safety Council 
statistics indicate that the worker is safer at work than at home - a statement that • • • is 
intentionally misleading." W. V1scus1, RISK BY CHOICE 71-75 (1983). Information provided 
cheaply to workers must be relatively favorable, since otherwise the firm will be forced to pay 
higher wages. 
A. SPENCE, MARKET SIGNALLING: INFORMATION TRANSFER IN HIRING AND RELATED 
SCREENING (Harvard Econ. Stud., vol. 143) (1974) describes the process of communication in 
transactions as signalling and examines the inefficiencies that occur when firms invest in making 
a product appear to have characteristics that it lacks. See infra note 150. 
78. Epstein, Constraints in Decisionmaking, in PUBLIC CONTROL OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
HEALTH HAZARDS, supra note 15, at 309-17, and Peto, Distorting the Epidemiology of Cancer: 
The Need for a More Balanced Overview, 284 NATURE 297 (Mar. 27, 1980), agree on the preva-
lence of manipulated toxicity data. Richard Peto writes that "[s]o many examples of financially 
motivated bias exist that the motives and work of industrial scientists and consultants are inevita· 
bly distrusted." Peto, supra, at 297. Epstein cites cases of poor-quality data and data manipula-
tion which not only increase the costs of regulation, but also cause considerable loss of private 
investment. He suggests that both conscious and unconscious motivations to produce positive 
data are inherent in the market situation: 
Escalating evidence has shown that constraints of data, ranging from gross inadequacy, 
biased interpretation, manipulation, suppression, and even to outright destruction, are com· 
monplace, especially when profitable technologies, both products and processes, are in· 
volved. Alarmingly, such evidence now justifies a priori reservations regarding the validity 
of any data developed by institutions or individuals whose economic interests are directly or 
indirectly affected. 
Epstein, supra, at 309. 
Portney discusses the problem of firms' incentives to choose testing procedures most likely to 
shed favorable light on the substances they wish to market. In some cases, incentives are strong 
enough to cause firms to falsify or withhold test data. Portney suggests three means by which to 
combat these incentives. First, well-defined testing procedures should be established and applied 
by all agencies regulating toxic substances. Second, federal agencies shoulCI expedite verification 
of controversial data. Third, stiff penalties should be levied for violating protocols or falsifying 
results. Portney, supra note 4, at 138. 
Deception has also been an issue in toxics litigation. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. 
Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 828 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). 
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terventions, however, must be designed to fit the needs of the situation 
and to minimize unintended secondary effects. Legal strategies in the 
toxics area have generally not met these conditions. 
III. THE FAILURE OF TRADITIONAL REGULATORY STRATEGIES 
Regulatory schemes that have attempted to correct these market 
dysfunctions have not succeeded. Neither the liability system nor reg-
ulation has effectively located responsibility for the toxic side effects of 
chemicals. Indeed, the law not only fails to encourage the production 
and distribution of toxicity data, it has tended to discourage it. 
Liability rules increase the costs of private production of such 
knowledge. The tort system is predicated upon the existence of infor-
mation linking cause with effect, but the manufacturer often is the 
only party in a financial position to perform the research necessary to 
prove a causal connection. Potential liability is therefore another in-
fluence that discourages manufacturers from producing this informa-
tion. Compensation schemes are similarly dependent on existing data 
to prove causation. 79 
Products liability rules have stimulated safety research where the 
reasons for plaintiffs' injuries are apparent or can be determined with 
relatively inexpensive expert assistance. The same dynamics could de-
velop with respect to chemicals, if the means of producing toxicity 
data were accessible to parties other than manufacturers, particularly 
to those who are exposed or their representatives. If there were in-
dependent sources of data, the potential costs to a manufacturer of not 
producing its own information might be high. Producing data and 
warning of negative effects would become a form of protection against 
the costs of liability. The existence of independent sources of data 
would also encourage higher quality in manufacturers' tests, because a 
third party would be able to check results. The liability system's de-
terrent effect thus depends upon a developed information context, with 
independent researchers. 
Although courts are generally in no position to mandate major re-
search initiatives and must await independent documentation of causal 
links, the need for testing has drawn some judicial attention. In 
Beshada v. Johns Manville Products Corp., so the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey faced the fact that manufacturers control the production 
of data on toxicity. Using "cheapest cost avoider" reasoning, the 
79. Viscusi, Structuring an Effective Occupational Disease Policy: Victim Compensation and 
Risk Regulation, 2 YALE J. REG. 53, 62-75 (1984); Schroeder & Shapiro, supra note 4, at 1244-
56. 
80. 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982). 
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court found that manufacturers' ability to conduct safety research pre-
cluded a state-of-the-art defense to a strict products liability claim for 
injury from asbestos exposure. 81 Later, the court retreated somewhat 
from this position, and its present stance is unclear. 82 However, 
awareness of producers' advantages in obtaining information is a per-
sistent theme in toxic tort decisions. For instance, in Borel v. 
Fibreboq.rd Paper Products Corp., 83 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit recognized a chemical manufacturer's duty to test in conjunc-
tion with the duty to warn, but did not elaborate on the extent of 
testing required. 84 This duty to test was apparently drawn from the 
line of cases dealing with a manufacturer's duty to test and label dan-
gerous drugs, a rule with early statutory roots. The idea of prospec-
tive testing was also present in the "Agent Orange" litigation, in which 
Judge Weinstein approved a settlement agreement, in part on the 
ground that the federal government planned to conduct research on 
the health effects of "Agent Orange."85 
Statutory solutions, which rely on controlled screening by adminis-
trative agencies, have also been attempted. 86 But the regulatory strate-
gies of the past two decades have been only partial improvements over 
the liability system. Agencies acquire and develop data in the course 
of regulating specific chemicals, although the process is influenced by 
the same market factors that handicap the liability system. Agencies 
also can issue reporting requirements and invest directly in research. 
81. 90 N.J. at 206-07, 447 A.2d at 548 (relying in part on Calabresi & Hirshoff, Toward a 
Test of Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972)). This position is supported by the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which has held that barring the state-of-the-art 
defense in asbestos cases, but not in others, does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. In re 
Asbestos Litig., 829 F.2d 1233 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1586 (1988). 
82. The limit on Beshada was articulated in a separate context, a case involving an injury 
related to a prescription drug. Without discussion, the court seemed to confine the Beshada .rule 
to the asbestos context. See Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 479 A.2d 374 (1984). 
83. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973). 
84. 493 F.2d at 1089 (stating only that tests "must be commensurate with the dangers 
involved"). 
85. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 851-57 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). 
However, government-sponsored studies have been hampered by lack of data. Lack of Military 
Data Halts Agent Orange Study, N.Y. Times, Sept. l, 1987, at Al, col. 3. 
86. This "purchasing agent" model of consumer protection has been criticized on the 
grounds that it imposes costs on consumers who may prefer to use cheaper, more dangerous 
products. Reich, Toward a New Consumer Protection, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 25 (1979). How-
ever, government intervention in a market is appropriate when there are hidden costs, nonrepeat 
sales, and low levels of competition; the first of these is certainly present in the chemicals market. 
Reich recommends that interventions avoid taking control over product quality or seller con-
duct; rather, they should overcome information weaknesses and facilitate independent informa-
tion brokers, which may need to be subsidized by government. See id., at 26, 31-39. But see 
Latin, Environmental Uncertainty, supra note 4, at 222-33. 
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The last approach generally has been more successful in generating 
useful data than have regulatory proceedings. 
There are two basic methods for setting standards for human expo-
sure to chemicals, normally accomplished by reviewing the health ef-
fects of one chemical at a time. 87 The first approach is ex ante 
regulation, which is used to control the effects of food additives, drugs, 
and pesticides. Substances so classified must be proved safe prior to 
marketing through a registration process in which the product's pro-
ponent has the burden of proof. In contrast, most environmental and 
occupational controls, like tort liability, are applied ex post -i.e., only 
when research establishes both significant exposure to and toxicity of a 
chemical. 88 In both approaches, the agency makes a determination of 
an acceptable level of human exposure, based upon the available infor-
mation on toxicity. 
In ex ante regulation, while the agency must either produce paral-
lel data or carefully check the toxicity data generated by a product's 
proponent, 89 the product's proponent must generate some information 
in order to get the product to the market. Product registration has 
yielded stronger informational support for regulators than has the ex 
post approach.90 The results of the National Research Council's sur-
vey in Toxicity Testing confirm that ex ante regulation is superior from 
the point of view of producing relevant health information.91 
In ex post regulation the agency, usually the EPA and OSHA, 
must collect the initial toxicity and exposure information. Since envi-
ronmental and occupational regulations impose costs which had been 
successfully externalized, the pressures of the market are arrayed 
87. Regulation by groups of chemicals is less common. RCRA authorizes EPA to regulate 
"waste" as such, rather than each element of a waste stream. 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (1982). Congress 
has occasionally directed EPA to regulate a list of pollutants. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7422 (1982); see 
also Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a) (1982). In the late 1970s, several 
agencies adopted "carcinogen policies" designed to settle basic scientific questions concerning the 
causes of cancer and to simplify the approach to regulation of suspected carcinogens. See, e.g., 
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Policy and Procedure for Identify-
ing, Assessing, and Regulating Airborne Substances Posing a Risk of Cancer, 44 Fed. Reg. 
58,642 (1979). This approach was set aside by the Reagan administration. 
88. Richard Stewart suggests that firms today generally have the burden of demonstrating 
acceptable social performance before operation or marketing; ex post regulation consists of polic-
ing, recalls, and registration cancellation based on new information. See Stewart, Regulation, 
Innovation, and Administrative Law, supra note 4, at 1269 & n.36. This framework assumes that 
agencies have complete information on the risks in their jurisdiction and adequate resources to 
fully regulate based on such information. · 
89. See Shapiro, supra note 76, at 181-83. 
90. See TOXICITY TESTING, supra note 10. 
91. See id., and CHEMICALS AND HEALTH, supra note 9, at 93-94, both of which recommend 
continuing to place responsibility for testing on industry before allowing the marketing of drugs 
or food additives. · 
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against ex post limits on chemical use and exposure. The regulated 
industry's incentive to produce data is limited to minimizing the costs 
of regulation, once regulation appears to be a likely outcome. Busi-
nesses can avoid or mitigate the costs of regulation by minimizing the 
amount or credibility of any existing information which indicates tox-
icity. Regulated firms have strong incentives to produce studies aimed 
at increasing uncertainty about any suspected toxic effects of chemi-
cals under review. Regulatory proceedings may continue for some 
time in a tug-of-war over the validity of toxicity data.92 A bottleneck 
develops as agency resources are absorbed in accumulating masses of 
data on the same limited problem and attention is channeled into a 
narrow, even obsessive focus. 
While standard-setting proceedings generate less useful informa-
tion than might be desired, there are other ways for agencies to obtain 
it. Since World War II, the government has built an extensive infra-
structure that supports and advances public environmental and health 
research. 
Today the National Toxicology Program (NTP) coordinates toxi-
cology and related research programs conducted by the National Insti-
tute for Environmental Health Sciences, the FDA's National Center 
for Toxicological Research, and the Centers for Disease Control's Na-
tional Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. The National 
Cancer Institute and other branches of the National Institutes of 
Health also perform or oversee research related to toxicology. The 
NTP publishes an annual list of all funded research projects to help 
92. The commentators often note failed or congested rulemaking processes in this context. 
E.g., Schroeder & Shapiro, supra note 4, at 1256-64; see also McGarity, Substantive and Proce· 
dural Discretion in Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Cardno· 
gens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L.J. 729, 730-31 (1979); Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and 
Administrative Law, supra note 4, at 1269, 1283-84. 
An example of this phenomenon is the EPA's implementation of the National Emissions 
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, mandated by § 112 of the Clean Air Act. After 
designating five pollutants as hazardous in the early 1970s and completing the required rulemak· 
ing within the statutory time limits, the EPA litigated the vinyl chloride designation with the 
plastics industry. Since then, the EPA has designated few chemicals as hazardous, even though 
many pollutants in the ambient air pose serious health risks. The format of the rulemaking 
proceeding and of judicial review makes it worthwhile for regulated businesses to litigate every 
aspect of an agency decision, as litigation will generally be cheaper than installing technological 
controls to reduce pollution. As a result, § 112 has consumed considerable agency resources and 
produced little health protection. 
Even where Congress has directed the EPA to issue rules controlling toxics within specific 
time periods, the process has bogged down. The history of 42 U.S.C. § 7422 (1982) is educative. 
See, e.g., New York v. Gorsuch, 554 F. Supp. 1060 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); 40 C.F.R. §§ 61.160-.186 
(1988). See generally Shapiro, Scientific Issues and the Function of Hearing Procedures: Evaluat· 
ing the FDA's Public Board of Inquiry, 1986 DUKE L.J. 288, 304-07 (discussing whether adver· 
sary proceedings are appropriate for scientific issues); Pederson, Formal Records and Informal 
Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38 (1975). 
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funding agencies avoid duplication in giving grants for research.93 
However, the National Research Council has noted problems with 
existing patterns of toxicological research and testing, including inade-
quate coverage and duplication. The Council recommended numer-
ous changes in priority-setting and coordination of the research 
process, building upon existing procedures and methodologies.94 
Congress has begun to experiment with private funding for public 
toxicological research. The Superfund Amendment and Reauthoriza-
tion Act of 1986 (SARA) expanded the authority of the Agency for 
Toxic Substances Disease Registry (ATSDR) and directed the EPA to 
promulgate regulations to require, where appropriate, payment by 
chemical manufacturers and processors of the costs of the ATSDR's 
research on 100 priority toxics found at hazardous waste sites.95 How-
ever, the EPA does not perceive this provision to be a mandate to 
establish a significant research program.96 
A more substantial proposal for private funding of agency research 
was included in recent amendments to the federal pesticide regulatory 
scheme. The impetus for this amendment was the finding that, at cur-
rent funding levels, the EPA would take forty years to complete test-
ing of products now on the market. The 1988 Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) amendments give the EPA 
the authority to set fees for the use of active pesticide ingredients and 
for registering pesticide products. The system is expected to generate 
$150 million for EPA pesticide administration and research, though 
93. See NATIONAL TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM: REVIEW, supra note 29, at 173; CHEMICALS 
AND HEALTH, supra note 9, at 88. 
94. See TOXICITY TESTING, supra note 10. 
95. The ATSDR was established under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), within the Public Health Service. CERCLA 
directed the ATSDR to develop an inventory of literature on the health effects of toxic sub-
stances and to "conduct periodic survey and screening programs to determine relationships be-
tween exposure to toxic substances and illness." CERCLA § 104(i), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i) (1982). 
The agency finally began operation under a 1983 consent decree following litigation over the 
Reagan administration's failure to implement the ATSDR. Environmental Defense Fund v. 
Heckler, 13 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,630 (D.D.C. 1983). 
In 1986, Congress significantly expanded the authority and responsibilities of ATSDR. To-
day, the ATSDR and the EPA must prepare and periodically expand a list of at least 100 sub-
stances that pose a health threat to humans because of their presence at designated Superfund 
waste sites. The ATSDR must collect existing health data on these substances and, where inade-
quate, must perform additional study. The EPA is directed to promulgate regulations to pro-
vide, where appropriate, for payment of the costs of research by manufacturers and processors 
identified through the TSCA and FIFRA registration process. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(2)-(5) (Supp. 
IV 1986). 
96. The proposed revised National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency 
Plan discusses treating documentation costs as clean-up costs, under certain circumstances, but it 
does not expand on SARA's direction to establish private funding for new health effects research. 
See 53 Fed. Reg. 51,394, 51,402 (1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.160(d)) (proposed Dec. 
21, 1988). 
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the latter will be literature searches, rather than production of new 
data.97 
The limited budget for publicly supported research is supple-
mented by administrative reporting requirements. The 1976 Toxic 
S'!lbstances Control Act (TSCA)98 is the major federal vehicle for col-
lecting and managing existing private data.99 The TSCA also gives the 
EPA limited authority to require manufacturers to conduct new tests 
of their products. 100 When enacted in 1976, the TSCA represented an 
important regulatory innovation. The EPA, in testimony before a 
House Subcommittee, declared: 
[T]he Nation's population and environment provide testing grounds for 
determining the effects a toxic substance has on human or environmental 
health. The authority contemplated by the Toxic Substances Control 
Act would establish requirements for testing substances believed to pose 
an unreasonable risk before they are dispersed by various means 
throughout the environment and are difficult, if not impossible, to 
controI. 101 
However, the TSCA has not fulfilled its early promise. 102 It has pro-
97. In September 1988, Congress reauthorized FIFRA. The new law requires the EPA to 
assess, within nine years, the health and environmental effects of about 600 active pesticide ingre· 
dients, many of which were approved based on testing procedures that are now outdated. The 
process, called reregistration, was required by the 1978 amendments to FIFRA, but at the cur-
rent funding and pace of testing the agency could not complete the task before the year 2024. To 
help speed the process, the 1988 FIFRA amendments will require all manufacturers of each 
active pesticide ingredient to share a fee of up to $150,000 and each product registrant to pay a 
fee of up to $425 for each year of the reregistration program. FIFRA Reauthorization Passes 
Senate, 3 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 626 (Oct. 12, 1988). 
98. 15 u.s.c. § 2601 (1982). 
99. Numerous other statutes require agencies to collect data and report to Congress. For 
example, the 1978 amendments to the National Cancer Act require the Department of Health 
and Human Services to prepare an annual report on all widely exposed chemicals that "may 
reasonably be anticipated to be carcinogens," including exposure data, an indication of whether 
the substance has been regulated, and an assessment of regulatory efficiency in reducing expo· 
sure. 42 U.S.C. § 24l(b)(4) (1982). Moreover, a number of federal laws give agencies broad 
authority to request and subpoena data from regulated firms. See, e.g .. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 7401, 7607 (1982). Some also require routine reporting of discharges of specified pollutants. 
See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1318 (1982). 
100. 15 U.S.C. § 2603 (1982). For an early history of the TSCA, see R. DRULEY & G. 
ORDWAY, THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT (1981). 
101. Toxic Substances Control Act: Hearings on R.R. 7229, H.R. 7548, and R.R. 7664 Before 
the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce, 94th Cong., lst Sess. 213 (1975) (statement of John R. Quarles, Jr., Deputy Adminis· 
trator, EPA). 
102. In H.R. REP. No. 968, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1980), the House Committee on Inter· 
state and Foreign Commerce noted that the EPA had failed to meet a number of statutory and 
internal deadline provisions. See also Recent Developments, Hazardous Substances - Environ· 
mental Protection Agency's Final Notification Rule Under the Toxic Substances Control Act, Sec· 
tion 12(b). 16 TEXAS INTL. L.J. 546, 548 (1981). 
TSCA's enactment was accompanied by the expectation that there would be a dramatic in· 
crease in the testing of chemicals. Companies such as Monsanto and Allied Chemicals increased 
their laboratory capacity and a number of companies joined to support the Chemical Industry 
Institute in conducting tests. The expected demand for testing never developed, however, and by 
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duced an inventory of chemicals in use, but has not generated or dis-
tributed significant amounts of exposure or toxicity data. 103 Even the 
inventory generated by the TSCA is incomplete, and large parts of it 
are unavailable for use outside the EP A's Office of Toxic 
Substances. 104 
The TSCA directs the EPA to screen toxics entering the market. 
The EPA keeps an inventory of all chemical substances used, manu-
factured, or imported in the United States. Manufacturers and im-
porters of new chemicals must notify the EPA and submit 
information, in the form of Premanufacture Notice~ (PMNs), concern-
ing each new chemical's structure, its intended uses, expected quanti-
ties of production, estimates of potential human exposure, and any 
health effects data that the manufacturer may have: no new testing is 
required. Based on the PMN information, the EPA is to screen each 
chemical to determine whether it presents an unreasonable health 
risk. 105 Most PMNs, however, do not contain much useful data. A 
1983 study by the Office of Technology Assessment found that only 
fifty-three percent of the notices contained any health or safety data at 
all. Data that were supplied dealt primarily with acute, relatively ap-
parent effects. Only about twenty percent contained data releval).t to 
1984 Dr. James Liverman, ofLitton-Bionetics, estimated that private testing.labs were operating 
at less than 60% of capacity. See w. DRAYTON, AMERICA'S Toxic PROTECTION GAP 76 
(1984). 
103. Under TSCA, the EPA has established the basic inventory of existing chemicals and a 
number of related data systems. These systems rely primarily on the data that manufacturers 
submit to the EPA in their premanufacture notices, but are also supplemented by the EPA staff. 
Interagency coordination of data management has also been a focus of TSCA implementation. 
See LAYMAN'S GUIDE, supra note 10, at 6-9. Many of these new substances are bioengineered 
products. · 
104. The Bureau of Labor Statistics refuses to give any of its firm-specific data to OSHA or 
any other group. W. V1scus1, supra note.77, at 84-85. 
105. 15 U.S.C. § 2604 (1982). The EPA usually compares the physiochemical properties of 
each chemical to others that have known effects as a coarse screen for selecting suspect chemicals 
for further testing. On this limited basis, the agency decides whether to require the manufactur_er 
to conduct tests or to limit production. A chemical structure that is similar to a proven health 
hazard provides some basis for concern about its possible effects, but similarity is not determina-
tive, as in the example of benzene and toluene. See supra text accompanying note 30. Critics of 
this approach point out that screening by analogy, as opposed to relying on direct test data,-may 
be a convenient proxy, but can be greatly deficient; for instance, this method would almost cer-
tainly have failed to identify PCBs as a risk, since they have low acute toxicity and are inert. See 
W. DRAYTON, supra note 102, at 72. 
TSCA also authorizes the EPA to monitor changes in production levels and uses of chemi-
cals. The EPA may determine by a rule that certain uses of chemical substances are "significant 
new uses." 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a)(2) (1982). Persons subject to a Significant New Use Rule 
(SNUR) must report. TSCA 1986 REPORT, supra note 10, at 13-15. Section 8 ofTSCA directs 
the EPA to promulgate rules to require record-keeping and reporting. Manufacturers and cer-
tain processors must maintain records of "significant adverse reactions." 15 U.S.C. § 2607(c) 
(1982). The EPA required submission of such records for the first time in 1986. 
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such long-term effects as cancer.106 
The EPA's authority under the TSCA to require development of 
new information is limited. 107 To require further tests or to limit pro-
duction, the EPA must conduct a rulemaking procedure, which must 
begin within ninety days of the PMN filing. The EPA may order test-
ing only if it demonstrates that the chemical may pose an unreason-
able risk to human health. 108 This involved process discourages 
agency action. The EPA has issued few orders requiring production 
of data beyond the initial submissions of manufacturers. 109 Instead, it 
has tended to engage in lengthy analyses of a few chemicals in order to 
support its findings of unreasonable risk. 11° 
TSCA's requirement that the EPA issue a rule before requiring 
testing distinguishes it from food, drug, and pesticide regulations, 
which mandate production of safety data prior to marketing. The 
TSCA standard essentially establishes a presumption of safety, 111 
which the agency must overcome before it may require further testing 
of a chemical. Thus, the TSCA's use of strict rulemaking standards 
inhibits the very information production the statute was written to 
encourage. 
106. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF PRE· 
MANUFACTURE NOTICES 50-51 (1983). 
107. The institutional capacity for implementing TSCA has developed slowly and is still in-
adequate. TSCA's basic inventory is being updated now for the first time. TSCA 1986 REPORT, 
supra note 10, at 4. 
108. The Administrator may issue a rule requiring further testing by the manufacturer if he 
finds that the chemical "may present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environ· 
ment" or that there "may be significant or substantial human exposure to [it]" and where there 
are insufficient data to determine reasonably its effects. 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a) (1982). If the Ad· 
ministrator finds that the chemical "will present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the 
environment," he may issue a rule regulating its production or distribution. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) 
(1982). 
Section 2603(e) ofTSCA establishes the Interagency Testing Committee (ITC), which is di-
rected to select and recommend to the EPA a list of no more than 50 chemicals each year whose 
risks warrant priority consideration. 15 U.S.C. § 2603(e)(l)(A) (1982). The EPA must then 
either initiate rulemaking to require testing by the manufacturer or publish its reasons for not 
doing so. 15 U.S.C. § 2603(e)(l)(B) (1982). 
109. As of 1983, the EPA had required testing on 4% of new chemicals. An additional 2% 
were voluntarily tested, and 1% were made subject to use controls. See W. DRAYTON, supra 
note 102, at 69. As of 1984, the EPA had issued no final rules requiring testing processes and 
had obtained 84 voluntary agreements to test. Id. at 72. In 1986, the EPA issued orders control-
ling exposure to 67 new chemicals, pending development of new data, pursuant to section 5(e) of 
TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2604(e) (1982). Forty-five other chemicals were withdrawn after the EPA 
announced it would take 5(e) or S(f) actions. This represents action on 112 out of the year's 
1693 PMNs. TSCA 1986 REPORT, supra note 10, at 9. Of the existing backlog of thousands, 
only 76 chemicals were reviewed. Of those, six were referred for information-gathering rules and 
51 are being evaluated further. Id. 
110. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 
595 F. Supp. 1255, 1258 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
111. Harlow, The EPA and Biotechnology Regulation: Coping with Scientific Uncertainty, 95 
YALE L.J. 553, 567 (1986). 
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While the ambition of TSCA to collect and produce useful data on 
chemicals has been only partially realized, the statute does recognize 
the central role of a comprehensive database for chemicals regulation. 
It also acknowledges, though only in a limited way, the validity of 
public authority to order private toxicity testing. This precept has 
now been expanded by the SARA and FIFRA provisions for private 
funding of public data management. The TSCA approach represents a 
transition, which is being followed by more sophisticated uses of data, 
including broad data dissemination. 
IV. DISTRIBUTING DATA IN THE MARKET 
Traditional regulatory approaches have neglected to distribute the 
information they do collect. The information access provisions in 
most environmental statutes have been, at best, unambitious reformu-
lations of the Freedom of Information Act. 112 They have simply pro-
vided for access to agency files, with exemption from disclosure for 
certain categories of information, such as trade secrets, and they have 
encouraged none of the potential uses of information to warn or guide 
private decisionmaking. Indeed, past laws have sometimes seemed to 
encourage behavior that has the characteristics of information 
hoarding. 
Right-to-know laws change existing information dynamics, mak-
ing chemicals visible in a new way, by providing new information to 
actors in the marketplace. The laws direct disclosure of both the iden-
tity of chemicals and information about chemicals' effects. Disclosure 
is currently limited to chemicals already known to have toxic 
potential. 
These disclosure requirements appear in both state and federal oc-
cupational health and environmental regulations. Many states enacted 
right-to-know laws in the late 1970s and early 1980s.113 State laws 
covering workers are now partially preempted by OSHA's Hazard 
112. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982) (FOIA) with 42 U.S.C. § 7414(c) (1982) (Clean Air 
Act). 
113. See supra note 2. The first state laws were in New York and California. See N.Y. 
PUBLIC HEALTH LAWS §§ 4800-4808 (McKinney 1985); N.Y. LABOR LAW§§ 875-883 (Mc-
Kinney 1985); CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 6360-6399 (West Supp. 1988). California has supple-
mented its original right-to-know statute with the more expansive Proposition 65. Cal. Admin. 
Notice Reg. 87, No. 11-Z (Mar. 13, 1987) (codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
§§ 25180.7, 25249.5-.13 (West Supp. 1988)). The proliferation of other state regulations is well 
reported. See generally BNA SPECIAL REPORT, RIGHT-TO-KNOW: A REGULATORY UPDATE 
ON PROVIDING CHEMICAL HAZARD INFORMATION (1985) [hereinafter RIGHT-TO-KNOW: A 
REGULATORY UPDATE] (twenty-five states had enacted worker right-to-know provisions as of 
1985). 
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Communication Standard. 114 After the disastrous leak of methyl iso-
cyanate at the Union Carbide pesticide plant in Bhopal, India, and 
several chemical accidents in the United States in 1985,115 Congress 
enacted the federal Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-
Know Act (EPCRA), Title III of the Superfund Amendment and 
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA). 116 The EPCRA does not pre-
empt state laws. 117 Consequently, the OSHA Hazard Communication 
Standard, Title III of SARA, and those state laws that relate to disclo-
sure outside the workplace together establish a broad program of data 
distribution. 
OSHA's Hazard Communication Standard contains a set of rules 
which have emerged as the basic framework of the overall information 
system. Originally written to apply only to the manufacturing sector, 
covering about 14 million workers in 300,000 establishments, OSHA 
was ordered in 1987 to expand its rules to cover all employees.us The 
OSHA rules require employers to identify and to warn workers only of 
known chemical hazards. 119 There is no requirement that employers 
114. See, e.g., New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey, 774 F.2d 587 {3d Cir. 
1985) (New Jersey Right-to-Know Act expressly preempted by the OSHA Hazard Communica-
tion Standard only insofar as the New Jersey Act pertains to the health and safety of manufactur-
ing employees); Manufacturers Assn. v. Knepper, 801 F.2d 130 {3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 
S. Ct. 66 (1987) (Pennsylvania Worker and Community Right-to-Know Act was not preempted 
outside the manufacturing sector; education and training requirement was preempted as to man-
ufacturing employees, but hazard survey, labeling, and Material Data Safety Sheets Require-
ments were only partially preempted); Ohio Mfrs. Assn. v. City of Akron, 801 F.2d 824 (6th Cir. 
1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 44 (1987) (the OSHA Hazard Communication Standard pre-
empted the City's right-to-know ordinance, although Congress did not expressly preempt local 
regulation of health and safety in the area of toxic and hazardous substances by provisions in 
OSHA). 
115. The most notable of these occurred in August 1985, when a cloud of toxic aldicarb 
oxime gas leaked from a Union Carbide plant in Institute, West Virginia, sending 135 people to 
the hospital for treatment. See Union Carbide: New Accidents Revive Safety Issues, 63 CHEM. & 
ENG. NEWS 4 (1985); Reducing the Risk of Chemical Accidents: The Post-Bhopal Era, 16 Envtl. 
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,300 (Oct. 1986); supra note 13 . 
. . 116. 42 U.S.C. § 116 (Supp. IV 1986). 
)17. 42 U.S.C. § 1104l(a) (Supp. IV 1986). 
118. See United Steelworkers v. Auchter, 763 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1985); 29 C.F.R. § 1910.S 
(1988). 
119. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200{b), (d)(2) (1988) (any health impact for which there is statisti-
cally significant evidence of effects from occupational exposure must be reported; "significant 
evidence" exists when there is at least one positive study conducted in accordance with estab-
lished scientific principles). OSHA's rules also establish standards for assessment of mixtures by 
employer-US\!rs downstream from the manufacturer. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(d)(5) {1988). Ifan 
employer uses a process that produces chemicals to which employees may be exposed, that em-
ployer becomes a "chemical manufacturer" within the meaning of the rules and is required to 
evaluate the hazard of the chemical. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(c) (1988). 
OSHA presumes chemicals to be hazardous if they are listed under Subpart Z of the OSHA 
standards for hazardous and toxic substances, if they are listed as carcinogens by the National 
Toxicology Program (NTP) or the International Agency for Research on Cancer {IARC), or if a 
Threshold Limit Value (TL V) has been adopted for the chemical by the American Conference of 
Governmental Industrial Hygienists. 29 C.F.R. § 1200(d), apps. A, B, and C (1988). A number 
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perform new tests on chemicals' health effects. However, the results of 
each existing study that indicates an adverse health effect must be 
communicated, whether the employer agrees with the study or not. 120 
The rules also specify labeling requirements for containers and con-
duits, require posting of warning notices in the workplace, and man-
date chemical safety training, which is an essential element of any 
information program from the worker's point of view. 121 
The basic medium of information exchange has been the Material 
Safety Data Sheet (MSDS). This form contains information about the 
chemical substance, including its chemical identity, the name used on 
the container label, its physical and chemical characteristics, health 
hazards, primary routes of entry or exposure, the regulatory provi-
sions applicable to it, safety precautions, emergency first aid proce-
dures, the date of preparation of the MSDS, and the name, address, 
and telephone number of the person responsible· for preparing it. 122 
The information is comprehensive and to the point. Unfortunately, 
OSHA requires no standard MSDS format and some states require 
disclosure of more information than does OSHA. MSDS formats and 
computerized information services are developing in incompatible 
formats, limiting the potential for comparing and combining 
of state Jaws have provided specifically for inclusion of additional lists of suspected hazardous 
chemicals and a few have established procedures for defining hazardous chemicals which are not 
currently on any list. For example, Pennsylvania provides for automatic updating of its hazard-
ous substance list whenever any of its constituent lists is changed. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, 
§ 7303(b) (Purdon Supp. 1988). 
120. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(b), (d)(5) (1988). 
121. Pursuant to OSHA's rules, employers are responsible for training workers who handle 
hazardous chemicals at the time of their initial assignment and whenever a new hazard is intro-
duced to the workplace; training includes informing workers about their rights under the hazard 
communication rules. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(h) (1988). Employers must have a written plan 
outlining their methods of communication with employees and listing all covered chemicals. 29 
C.F.R. § 1910.1200(e) (1988). 
122. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(g) (1988). OSHA and most states require that for each 
chemical the manufacturer must prepare an MSDS. MSDSs have been in use for more than a 
decade, but previously were not mandatory. Support for mandatory and automatic provision of 
MSDSs by manufacturers and importers was very strong at the OSHA hearings and came from 
many sectors of business that use but do not manufacture chemicals. See 48 Fed. Reg. 53,280, 
53,305-07 (1983). 
The Material Safety Data Sheets must be made available to all buyers and employees. Several 
states provide for definite time periods for employer responses to an information request, while 
OSHA requires an immediate response. Several provide that a worker need not work with a 
substance for which the information has not been provided and several stipulate that a worker 
may not be discriminated against because of an information request. For a digest of the federal 
and state Jaws, see RIGHT-TO-KNOW: A REGULATORY UPDATE, supra note 113; HAZARDOUS 
MATERIALS: RIGHT-TO-KNOW NEWS, Nov. 15, 1985, at 5-12. 
OSHA and 17 states require labeling of hazardous chemical containers, and 23 states require 
training of employees handling chemicals. See RIGHT-TO-KNOW: A REGULATORY UPDATE, 
supra note 113. 
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information. 123 
Although the chemicals it covers are in part selected according to 
different standards, the EPCRA's communication requirements build 
upon OSHA's rules. The EPCRA is designed primarily to enable lo-
calities to prepare an emergency response to chemical accidents. Sec-
tion 301 of the EPCRA mandates the formation of state and local 
emergency response committees, which are responsible for local plan-
ning.124 Section 312 requires that every firm subject to OSHA's rules 
complete an inventory of chemicals covered by those rules and provide 
it to the local committee. The inventory must contain a description of 
the amount and storage location of hazardous chemicals. 125 Industrial 
facilities that use chemicals on the EP A's list of "extremely hazardous 
substances" must notify the local committee of the presence of these 
chemicals, immediately report any unexpected releases, and partici-
pate in the committee's planning activities.126 The local committee 
has discretion to determine whether all of the section 312 inventory 
data are to be made available to the public.127 
The EPCRA also directs the EPA to begin compiling a national 
database on routine toxic discharges into the environment. Section 
313, the national toxics inventory provision, requires that firms locate 
and quantify discharges into the environment of any of 329 specified 
chemicals. 128 These must be reported annually to the EPA, which is 
to use them to assess the nation's use of chemicals. The national tox-
ics inventory will also provide the basis for more sophisticated regula-
tory planning, 129 and the inventory data must be made accessible to 
123. See infra notes 172, 204 and accompanying text. 
124. 42 U.S.C. § 11,001 (Supp. IV 1986). 
125. 42 U.S.C. § 11,022 (Supp. IV 1986). 
126. 42 U.S.C. § 11,004 (Supp. IV 1986). 
127. 42 U.S.C. § l l,022(e)(3) (Supp. IV 1986). Delaware, Florida, Maine, Washington, and 
West Virginia have established poison information centers which give out information on toxics 
to the public. See RIGHT-TO·KNOW: A REGULATORY UPDATE, supra note 113, at 109, 114, 
129, 209, 212. Illinois has established a Health and Hazardous Substances Registry and requires 
the new Epidemiological Studies Division of the Department of Public Health to gather data 
about hazardous substance use in the state. Id. at 24. 
128. 42 U.S.C. § l l,023(c) (Supp. IV 1986). 
129. The reported data are subject to the market influences outlined supra in Part Ill, which 
may result in some distortion. Also, currently available statistics on domestic production and 
consumption do not quantify how much of a chemical agent comes into contact with the popula-
tion; rather they reflect only the amount potentially available for exposure. See Davis, Bridbord 
& Schneiderman, supra note 11, at 296. These gaps will be partially remedied by the EPCRA 
inventory, which will begin to identify the amount of chemicals released into the environment 
and the locations where they are released. In addition, the EPA recently received a report from a 
panel it commissioned to study the agency's need for data on pollution levels in the environment. 
The report recommends the creation of an environmental institute, to be separate from the EPA, 
to help the agency set up programs to monitor basic ecological systems. Problems with Data 
Collection Hinder Efforts on Pollution, Experts Say, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1988, at C4, col. I. 
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any person on a reasonable cost reimbursement basis. 130 
The new laws require a widespread exchange of information, 131 
and entail significant expense, particularly the start-up costs of identi-
fying chemicals and exposures.132 However, their benefits are likely to 
be substantial. 
The normative rationales for disclosure are also impressive and 
standing alone may justify right-to-know programs. Right-to-know 
laws articulate minimum standards of warning and informed consent 
for hazardous chemicals. They are a logical legislative response to the 
duty to test and warn recognized in Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products 
Corp. 133 The content and scope of the manufacturer's duty to warn 
has been a major preoccupation of the tort system in the fifteen years 
130. 42 U.S.C. § 11,023(1) (Supp. IV 1986). The first results from the inventory are being 
released. Environmental groups have compiled the EPA data into reports on specific geographic 
regions, focusing on air pollution as the largest category of pollution. Environmental groups are 
distributing the information and calling on industry to reduce air emissions by 90% in four years, 
as the Monsanto Company has stated it will do. Environmental Groups Compile Reports Based 
qn EPCRA Section 313 Emissions Data, 3 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 509 (1988). 
131. One estimate of the number of MSDSs being prepared is 20 million, but the extent of 
duplication is difficult to gauge. COMMUNITY RIGHT-TO-KNOW NEWS, May 8, 1987. 
132. The new laws require firms to invest in collecting and communicating information. 
Both the EPA and OSHA have analyzed the costs of their rules. OSHA conducted an extensive 
regulatory impact analysis in 1983. It concluded that the benefits of the hazard communication 
rules will greatly exceed their costs. The total cost of the rules {present value) was estimated to 
be $3,374 million, using a 10% discount rate over a 40-year period. Initial costs were expected to 
be $603.926 million, or $43 per employee, with annual costs of $158.87 million, or $11 per em-
ployee. The total benefits from lessened health impacts, reduced search, and standardized federal 
rules will be $6,141.821 million, discounted at a 10% rate over a 40-year period. Benefits in the 
first year, $290.155 million, will increase to $1,050.782 million in the twentieth year, and to 
$2,354.561 million in the fortieth year. See 48 Fed. Reg. 53,280, 53,327-29 (1983). 
The EPA has estimated that the§ 313 reporting requirements ofTSCA will apply to approxi-
mately 32,760 manufacturing facilities and that an average facility will have four chemicals and 
one mixture to report. The EPA's proposed inventory form would involve a cost of $12,467 for 
the average facility in the first year and $9,427 in subsequent years. The bulk of the first-year 
cost would be generated by the firm's initial research to identify its own toxic discharges. EPA 
also estimated that only three percent of small businesses in manufacturing will have reporting 
obligations. The costs to EPA for developing and maintaining the § 313 database will range 
from $4.1 million to $14.3 million in 1988. EPA did not attempt to estimate the benefit of the 
rules. Regulatory Impact Analysis in Support of Proposed Rule Making Under Section 313, 
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, OPTS-EPA, May 1987. The Agency 
is now in the process of comparing actual costs for the first year with its estimates. 
These Agency estimates do not indicate the full benefits of these laws. Even OSHA's analysis 
omitted significant potential beneficial effects, including secondary influences on manufacturers 
and employers to substitute safer products and to support research in toxicity. 
Some observers suggest that companies overestimate the costs of new regulations. A classic 
example was the industry opposition to OSHA's vinyl chloride standards. Although the industry 
predicted that compliance costs would reach between $65 billion and $90 billion, the actual cost 
totaled less than $1 billion. In addition, the standard increased the industry's productivity by 
improving housekeeping, encouraging innovation, and avoiding potential public health problems 
caused by exposure to vinyl chloride. Chemical Hazards at Work: Whose Business?, 9 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 331, 345 (1985) {panel discussion remarks of Caron Chess, Right-to-Know 
Coordinator, N.J. Dept. of Envtl. Protection). 
133. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). 
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since Borel The courts most often have discussed information issues 
in the familiar terms of the common law of torts: you have a duty to 
warn others of a danger you have created; you are entitled to choose 
the terms on which your body is touched by someone else. 
The laws also appear to be justified on utility grounds. The eco-
nomic function of disclosure is to correct the market failure caused by 
the basic asymmetries of information, inherent in the chemicals mar-
ket.134 During OSHA's hazard communication rulemaking proceed-
ings, some industry representatives urged the agency to require 
communication only of risk estimates. They argued that this would 
have the same effect on workers' caution as more specific disclosure. 
OSHA chose instead to require notice of chemical identity and all doc-
umented health effects. OSHA's approach puts workers, commercial 
purchasers, and consumers in a position to make their own choices as 
to exposure and to seek assistance in making these decisions. 
A case history illustrates the way disclosure can work. Male work-
ers at an Occidental Petroleum plant, which manufactured pesticides, 
were talking over lunch and learned that none were fathering any chil-
dren. Through their union they had sperm counts taken, which con-
firmed their suspicion of sterility. Because FIFRA requires that 
pesticide ingredients be chemically identified, the workers were able to 
identify their exposures. The union's researchers then were able to 
specify three chemicals, including debromochloropropane (DBCP), 
that were possible causes of sterility. When the workers raised the 
subject· with Occidental, they discovered that the company already 
had internal data suggesting that DBCP is a cause of infertility. 135 
134. See Beales, Craswell & Salop, supra note 70, at 491, 513; Reich, supra note 86, at 20; 
Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and 
Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 632 (1979); Schwartz & Wilde, Impelfect Informa-
tion in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. 
L. REV. 1387, 1388-89 (1983). 
As Professors Beales, Craswell, and Salop have expressed it, 
information ·remedies allow consumers to protect themselves according to personal prefer· 
ences rather than place on regulators the difficult task of compromising diverse preferences 
with a common standard. At the same time, information remedies place the burden of 
enforcement of quality on informed consumers in conjunction with marketplace forces. 
This is often a more efficient enforcement mechanism, since consumers are constantly moni-
toring in the course of their market search, thus relieving regulators of this task. Firms then 
self-enforce their own compliance out of competition-induced profit motives rather than 
from the fear of government compliance actions. 
Beales, Craswell & Salop, supra note 70, at 513-14. 
For an application of the information economics literature to occupational health issues, see 
Schroeder & Shapiro, supra note 4, at 1231. See also EMPLOYMENT HAZARDS -AN INVEST!· 
GATION OF MARKET PERFORMANCE (1979); Viscusi, supra note 79, at 53. 
135. Another source reports that the company doctor at the plant where these men worked 
had himself conducted rodent tests indicating that testicular atrophy resulted from exposure to 
DBCP. However, when the workers questioned the doctor as to why they had not been informed 
of his test results, he told them that there was no evidence of such effects in humans and there· 
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This conclusion was confirmed by tests at other plants, where workers 
exposed to the other two suspect chemicals, but not to DBCP, wei:e 
found to have healthy, normal sperm counts.136 Occidental then sub-
stituted a new chemical in the manufacturing process. 
This story illustrates how access to chemical identity data allows 
the market, medical, and liability systems to function. Providing 
workers with health effects and exposure information places them in a 
position to seek assistance, to make choices about their own exposure, 
and to negotiate for less toxic conditions in the workplace. 137 In addi-
tion, if the suspect chemical is a consumer product, exposure to toxics 
may be reduced in the general population through increased vigilance 
by manufacturing workers. It is not feasible for agencies to make 
medical use of the data at the individual level and to oversee the myr-
iad market transactions involving chemicals. Administrative agencies' 
centralized collection and management of data is complemented by 
distribution, which decentralizes responsibility for health and safety 
and lightens the administrative agencies' burden of regulation. 138 Crit-
ics of right-to-know laws claim that these iaws will needlessly alarm 
the public and ttjvialize warnings by requiring unnecessary notices. 
However, individually and in groups, people already handle substan-
tial amounts of complex information. Indeed, they are already called 
upon by the economic system to estimate the health risks of chemicals, 
though without the assistance of specific information. 
It may not be necessary for all consumers or workers to be active 
in using the new information to bargain for better product quality. A 
small group of energetic "comparison shoppers" can have significant 
fore he had no obligation to tell them anything. Chemical Hazards at Work: Whose Business?, 
supra note 132, at 354 (panel discussion remarks of Charley Richardson, Mass. Commn. on 
Occupational Safety & Health). 
136. See FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 41, at 11-24. 
137. Information exchange about job risks already takes place to some degree but the accu-
racy and efficiency of the exchange is limited. There is evidence that workers who believe their 
jobs are risky are in fact paid risk premiums, but these premiums might be different if the work-
ers were fully cognizant of the risks they face .. W. V1scus1, supra note 77, at 43-44, 93-113; see 
also M. BAILEY, REDUCING RISKS TO LIFE (1980). Viscusi maintains that there is" a "quit" 
response to risks that are revealed by on-the-job experience and that firms can reduce costs by 
eliminating the job risk-quit response relationship. See W. V1scus1, supra note 77, at 64-75. 
Viscusi also argues that the safety incentives created by market mechanisms may be consider-
ably stronger than those created by OSHA exposure standards. He finds that a conservative 
estimate of the total 1979 job risk premiums for the entire private sector was $69 billion, almost 
3,000 times the total annual penalties levied by OSHA. OSHA penalties were only 34 cents per 
worker, while risk premiums per worker were $925 annually. Id. at 44. · -· 
138. Information remedies, in conjunction with marketplace forces, place part of the burden 
for enforcement of product quality on consumers. This may be a more efficierit enforcement 
mechanism, since consumers can monitor quality in the course of their market search, and re-
lieve regulators of this task. Businesses may self-enforce out of competition-induced profit mo-
tives. See Beales, Cras_well & Salop, supra note 70, at 491, 502. · 
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effects. 139 This option may be most available with consumer prod-
ucts, 140 but it could evolve in other contexts. Unions and nonprofit 
public interest groups have adopted this function to a limited extent, 
by sifting through information and organizing to acquire more of it. 
Third-party service providers of information services would be an 
important development in toxics control. Professional environmental 
services, such as the emerging environmental auditor, and consumer 
and worker-oriented data and diagnosis services, could evolve as a 
part of an independent market for toxicology, as the costs of exposure 
are identified and as research to prevent harmful side effects becomes 
more valuable. It is possible that a market in data could be sustained, 
if the law supported it by funding research to satisfy the comparison 
shoppers, both consumer and business. It has also been suggested that 
once toxicity data is generally available, the incentives of chemical 
manufacturers may be reversed, because lower toxicities will commu-
nicate an advantage. Voluntary testing and disclosure could become 
the pattern in competitive markets.141 
Disclosure of chemical identity also forges a new link in the liabil-
ity system. It should affect the number and specificity of tort and 
worker compensation claims and add to the incentive to screen prod-
ucts for toxicity. One OSHA official maintains that there already have 
been visible signs of change effected by right-to-know laws. Before the 
rules were enacted, workers typically complained to OSHA in only 
vague terms about health symptoms. Complaints now refer to symp-
toms more specifically and connect them to chemicals identified under 
139. Schwartz and Wilde have applied work on search strategies to consumer law and sug· 
gest that "consumers who invest in information [Le., comparison shoppers] exert a positive (pe-
cuniary) externality on those who choose to purchase at random - the searchers police the 
market." Wilde & Schwartz, Equilibrium Comparison Shopping, 46 REV. ECON. STUD. 543, 551 
(1979). 
140. David Roe, a principal author of California's Proposition 65 and an attorney with the 
Environmental Defense Fund, pointed out that results were prompt: "Several national snack· 
food makers pulled back their products because they had excessive lead in them. Who ever 
suspected there was lead in snack foods? I didn't." Hinds, As Warnings Multiply, Messages Are 
Ignored, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1988, at Al, col. 3; see also Beales, Benefits and Costs of Label 
Information Programs, in BANBURY REPORT 6: PRODUCT LABELING AND HEALTH RISKS 243, 
247 (1980). 
141. Viscusi suggests that a voluntary disclosure or "unraveling" process may occur and 
continue until all the firms have disclosed or until a stable equilibrium is established, with some 
participants withholding information. Unraveling is most likely to occur from the top down; 
that is, the best firm discloses and others follow. Viscusi suggests that publicity of the conditions 
in the worst firms is likely to have the opposite effect. See W. V1scus1, supra note 77, at 134-43. 
He recommends disseminating information through government mechanisms that operate simi· 
larly to right-to-know laws, but amplified by public or independent rating of safety levels. Once 
measurements are accessible most firms will have incentives to disclose their health and safety 
performance and to compete for quality in this dimension. Id. at 71, 84-87. 
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the rules. 142 Insurance companies are also taking an interest in the 
quality of hazard communication programs, regarding them as an in-
dication of the insured's sophistication in preventing liability.143 In 
the tort area, the new notice requirements are double-edged. While 
disclosure will help plaintiffs identify defendants and may prove causa-
tion, it will also warn potential plaintiffs and thus remove one of the 
major grounds for toxic tort recovery. 144 These benefits have begun to 
be recognized by the regulated community.145 
Right-to-know laws also will establish a more specific and broader 
base of information for researchers. The EPCRA requires businesses 
to maintain an inventory of each point of exposure to toxic chemicals 
and to make this data available to researchers. This process is creating 
a much more detailed record of exposure than has existed before and 
should help to yield more specific measurements. 
Federal right-to-know laws grew out of state ~aw experiments. In 
the past few years, several states have established some innovative var-
iations on the disclosure theme. The most celebrated - or infamous 
- elaboration is California's Proposition 65, which requires busi-
nesses to warn the general public of any potential exposure to chemi-
cals identified in the statute.146 Another innovation, New Jersey's 
Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act, 147 requires parties to real 
estate transactions to assess the toxicity of the soil and groundwater at 
the site, arrange for its cleanup prior to closing, and secure state certi-
142. See A Look at the First Full Year of the HC Standard Implementation and Beyond, 
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS RIGHT-TO-KNOW NEWS, May 15, 1987, at 6-8 (statement of Jennifer 
Silk, health scientist with OSHA's Office of Health Standards). But see Staten & Umbeck, A 
Study of Signalling Behavior in Occupational Disease Claims, 29 J. L. & EcoN. 263 (1986). How-
ever, Staten and Umbeck focus on stress claims, which are more manipulable than other 
symptoms. 
143. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS RIGHT-TO-KNOW NEWS, Mar. 15, 1987, at 10-11. 
144. Chemical identity disclosure may also expand the liability of unions. See O'Reilly, 
supra note 74, at 307, 320-22. But cf Hinds, supra note 140 (suggesting that most product 
liability claims are not precluded by warnings). 
145. See J. O'Reilly, Why OSHA Hazard Communication Offers You Real Benefits in Re-
turn for Its Real Costs, Presentation at Executive Enterprises, Inc. conference entitled Right to 
Know: Bringing Industry into Compliance (Feb. 25, 1986). 
146. "Proposition 65" is the popular name for the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforce-
ment Act of 1986. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CpDE §§ 25180.7, 25249.5-.13 (West Supp. 1989). 
The law mandates that no business may expose people to chemicals that cause cancer or birth 
defects without giving a "clear and reasonable" warning. The law also shifts the burden of regu-
lation onto industry by providing that exceptions to the warning requirement are allowed only if 
companies meet the burden of proving "no significant risk" of human cancer or, with respect to 
birth defects, "no observable effect" at 1000 times the level of exposure. These standards are not 
required to be set by the administrative agency, but industry has pushed for rules to limit its 
liability, which might otherwise be litigated under the warning requirements of the law. Twenty-
nine substances are now listed in the Act. Cal. Admin. Notice Reg. 87, No. 11-Z, at A-16 (Mar. 
13, 1987). 
147. N.J. STAT. ANN. § l3:lk-6 (West Supp. 1988). 
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fication of the adequacy of the cleanup plan. New York State has en-
acted requirements that notice be given of potential exposure from 
pesticide application prior to each occurrence. 148 Another trend is to-
ward increased medical monitoring of exposed workers, such as that 
required by New York's, and several other states', worker right-to-
know laws; similar federal legislation is pending in Congress, 149 and 
OSHA is considering promulgating medical monitoring rules. 150 The 
New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized medical monitoring as a 
tort remedy for townspeople exposed to toxic groundwater pollu-
tion.151 A related development is the emergence of a new environmen-
tal profession, the environmental auditor, whose function, in part, is to 
act as an independent interpreter of toxicity information. 1s2 
It is too soon to measure the impact of right-to-know laws. While 
recent developments are promising, the market resources of chemical 
producers and users are unequal. Small businesses, workers, and the 
public-at-large generally do not have the financial means to purchase 
data interpretations or comparisons. Also, even where toxicity infor-
mation is available, individuals may not be able to act on it. Workers 
are particularly vulnerable with respect to occupational health risks. 
Geographic and economic factors limit their discretion to choose 
among risks. Those who bear more general environmental risks are 
often subject to the same factors; families rarely can move to secure 
better air or water quality. The comparison shopper market will be 
limited, not only by the transaction costs of organizing into a body 
capable of reviewing and selecting among the research priorities, but 
also by the high cost of testing. 
Not only individuals, but small organizations, including local and 
even state governments, have difficulty acquiring and managing this 
data. The EPCRA is inadequately funded, even to accomplish its ex-
148. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW§§ 33-0905, 33-1003 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1988). 
149. A Senate filibuster defeated a medical monitoring bill, the High Risk Occupational Dis· 
ease Notification and Prevention Act, S. 79, lOOth Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. 53,233 (daily 
ed. Mar. 29, 1988). Its sponsors, however, may reintroduce it. See Bill Is Rejected on Toxin 
Warnings, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1988, at A23, col. 1 (quoting the bill's sponsor, Sen. Metzen· 
baum, as saying: "[A]s long as workers are kept in the dark about occupational hazards, we will 
continue to try to bring them light."). 
· 150. OSHA has initiated two generic rulemaking proceedings that would set new require· 
ments for exposure monitoring and medical surveillance for employers. 53 Fed. Reg. 37,591, 
37,595 (1988). 
151. See Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 106 N.J. 557, 525 A.2d 287 (1987). 
15i. Several states no~ license environmental auditors. Scagnelli, Protocol 3 WORKING PA· 
PERS - A NEWSLETTER FROM THE INST. FOR ENVTL. AUDITING 5 (June 1987). See also New 
Jersey's Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Act, 'N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-19 (West Supp. 1988), 
which requires companies to perform environmental audits and develop risk management 
programs. 
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plicit goal of preparing localities for accidents. The statute places pri-
mary responsibility on state and local governments which do not have 
the funds to finance the transition into this new role. While computer-
ized services are developing, many local emergency planning commit-
tees cannot afford to study their own needs nor to establish the 
connections that would allow them to function. Instead, they are opt-
ing to take the data in hard copy, where it often sits in boxes unused. 
The prospects for more active market participation in toxicity data 
are substantially improved by right-to-know laws, but a central role 
for public intervention remains unfulfilled. The legal system could be 
designed to orchestrate greater and more efficient investments, in both 
data production and management. 
V. REsTRUCTURING PRIVATE RESEARCH INCENTIVES 
Dean Calabresi noted in The Costs of Accidents, 153 "[o]ne could 
build a whole theory of primary cost avoidance in terms of incentives 
to discover cures .... Usually, however, we apparently do not believe 
that a different allocation of most disease costs would do much to spur 
reduction of their number or severity."154 Incentives to discover cures 
can be supported in the chemical toxicity context, if the market's in-
formation dynamics are taken into account. 
Among the laws which aim to stimulate private research, such as 
the patent system and product liability 'law, two models provide for 
direct funding of research. One might be called the "seed money" 
model, a variant of which has been proposed to encourage research on 
superconductivity.155 In this model, public money is provided as an 
inducement for research and development in a particular sector of the 
economy, in the hope that it will lead to the long-term development of 
marketable products. Another approach is to select a particular goal 
and fund efforts to attain it. For example, Congress has enacted a 
program to spur research on "orphan drugs," those which treat rare 
diseases and therefore have little commercial value.156 The orphan 
drug program finds sponsors for research on rare diseases and pro-
153. G. CALABRESI, THE Cosrs OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
(1970). 
154. Id. at 44. Dean Calabresi suggests that occupational diseases and product-related dis-
eases can be treated in the same way as accidents, in that they can be reduced in number and 
severity by the same methods, including methods aimed at primary cost reduction. 
155. Panel Asks Strong U.S. Push to Develop Superconductors, N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1989, at 
Al, col. 1 (natl. ed.). 
156. See HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, REPORT ON THE ORPHAN DRUG 
Acr, H.R. REP. No. 840, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 3577. 
1836 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 87:1795 
vides them with financial incentives in the form of grants and tax 
breaks. 157 These approaches are useful where the need for the infor-
mation is limited or as yet undeveloped. That is not the case, however, 
with the need for chemical toxicity data. 
Chemicals in commercial use, far from being orphans, affect huge 
numbers of people and businesses. This circumstance provides oppor-
tunities for adjusting research incentives in the chemicals market. The 
recent amendments to FIFRA and SARA recognize the option of 
making industry pay for the research required by its externalities, but 
these laws would simply tax the industry to finance limited govern-
ment efforts and fail to take full advantage of market dynamics to 
stimulate private production of data. 
A more ambitious and promising approach would be to adapt the 
design of the national hazardous waste clean-up program to foster pri-
vate research sponsored by the users of chemical products. The cur-
rent deficit of toxicity and exposure data is analogous to the current 
hazardous waste problem. Both have hidden impacts and delayed ef-
fects and require costly public initiatives to remedy, and both are ex-
ternalities generated by the same group of industries. In addition, 
CERCLA attempts to involve all the parties who have an interest in a 
site (whether that interest is past or prospective) and to provide those 
who want to remedy the hazardous condition with the financial sup-
port to do so. This type of mechanism is needed to mobilize latent 
forces in the market to generate more toxicity data. 
Hazardous waste cleanup is being carried out pursuant to 
CERCLA, commonly called "Superfund," and the 1986 amendments 
to the Superfund contained in SARA. Pursuant to CERCLA, the 
EPA has published a National Priority List, which identifies the hun-
dreds of locations that require attention. The statute's Superfund and 
liability provisions provide funding for the actual cleanup. The basic 
fund itself is derived from taxes on the petrochemical industry and 
from general revenues. Cleanup operations may be financed from thi.s 
fund or by "potentially responsible parties" (PRPs), who, when identi-
fiable, are held liable for clean-up costs. PRPs may be waste genera-
tors, or haulers, or property owners, or tenants - virtually anyone 
associated with the presence of the waste at the site. The cleanup may 
be carried out by local, state, or federal agencies or by private parties, 
157. Id. Biomedical research takes place in three contexts: the federal government; non· 
profit medical centers, which are chiefly in medical schools and are largely funded through the 
federal grant system; and the pharmaceutical industry. In 1982, the FDA reported to Congress 
that it had approved approximately 960 drugs for rare diseases. But of these, only 34 were 
developed and marketed by companies; with 24 of these 34, a government agency or a university 
had assisted in either the financing or the research. Id. at 3579-80. 
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who then may seek reimbursement from the fund or from identifiable 
PRPs. Most CERCLA cases are initiated by the EPA or state agen-
cies which then negotiate for further involvement by PRPs. 
The Superfund program thus combines three elements: (1) a plan 
for action, formulated and published by the government; (2) a source 
of funding that attempts to link the costs of cleanup to the parties 
most responsible for the hazardous condition; and (3) open participa-
tion in the process, with financial support made available to any party 
interested in undertaking to clean up a site. While the Superfund pro-
gram has been criticized as unwieldy, some of its problems surely are 
attributable to the nature of its difficult task. In any event, the design 
of the Superfund is instructive as a model program to address current 
chemical research needs, a program which I will call "super study," 
for lack of a better name. 
In a "super study" program, research would be conducted accord-
ing to a general plan, by a combination of private and public institu-
tions.158 Private laboratories or government agencies could conduct 
studies according to test protocols specified by the plan and then regis-
ter the test results. The costs of different types of study could be stan-
dardized. Documented research, with peer r~view completed, would 
be reimbursed from the general fund. Reimbursement to the fund by 
chemical producers would be mandated when studies showed adverse 
health effects from their individual chemicals or identified mixtures. 
Basic screening and research, and methodological research, would also 
be reimbursed from the general fund. 
Reimbursement actions against manufacturers would be managed 
by a separate custodian of the fund, so that research results would not 
be influenced by the need to support the fund. Responsible parties, 
producers comparable to the Superfund PRPs, could be identified 
through the TSCA, the new inventory provisions of the EPCRA, the 
registration provisions of the FDA, and the pesticide laws. Joint and 
several liability could be established by law, with liability apportioned 
on the basis of human exposure rates. Long-term epidemiological 
studies could also be funded by dischargers, based upon the extent of 
human exposure caused by their discharges. 
A national study plan would be published and managed by the 
National Toxicology Program, the National Institute of Environmen-
158. See Shapiro, supra note 76, at 175-82 (discussing possibility of both limited and com-
plete third-party testing, either by the government or by independent contractors); CHEMICALS 
AND HEALTH, supra note 9, at 96 (urging that serious consideration be given to supporting the 
National Center for Toxicological Research with a contractual laboratory, associated with aca-
demic sciences, and perhaps through a consortium of universities). 
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tal Health Sciences (NIEHS), or another suitable agency. It could be 
managed as a more formalized version of the present national toxicol-
ogy research agenda and grants programs, or it could adopt the Na-
tional Research Council's recommendations for toxicological research 
published in Toxicity Testing. 159 The National Research Council has 
reviewed a variety of screening proposals and recommended a system 
that would operate in several stages, selecting chemicals for further 
research at each stage, based on their human exposure and potential 
toxicity. 160 The Toxicity Testing approach is not the only planning 
resource available, of course; the public health research community is 
a ready repository of expertise in research management. 
One basic appeal of a "super study" program, in contrast to the 
Superfund hazardous waste program, is that the investment would 
come at the beginning of the production process, when information 
can be useful in many environmental and health dimensions. A re-
search program's benefits would also be broader than the Superfund's 
focus on hazardous dump sites, because much of the data produced 
would be applicable across different media. The current Superfund 
allocation of $8.6 billion for waste site cleanup is addressing only part 
of a broader pollution problem. The amount of waste discharged into 
other media, particularly air, is greater than that disposed in landfills. 
The rationale for taxing the entire petrochemical industry to sup-
port research is also stronger than it is for hazardous waste cleanup. 
Research would benefit the entire system, including the industry itself, 
by providing a better basis for product screening in the marketplace 
and by removing the pall cast over safe products by uncertainty about 
toxicity. Moreover, a tax that is imposed on future behavior, before 
159. See TOXICITY TESTING, supra note 10. 
160. In stage one, fragments of available information would be collected, including all indica· 
tors of exposure, and fed into a computer program. A set of rules would be applied by the 
computer to determine whether the levels of exposure and known toxicity indicators suggest that 
further examination .is needed. If certain indicators were triggered, the chemical would then be 
passed on to stage two, with grades keyed to priorities for further research. The grades would 
also indicate the appropriate amount of funding to be spent on the research. 
In stage two, the stage-one dossier would be reviewed by two experts, one in toxicity and one 
in exposure. If no tests were currently in progress, each expert would design and conduct a 
research strategy using currently available data. After considering all relevant factors, they 
would make a recommendation concerning further study. Stage three would consist of a more 
thorough assessment by a committee of experts. Stage four would entail actual field or labora· 
tory research. 
When these four stages were completed, the results would be fed back into the system to 
check reliability. Final study results would be used by regulators and would be evaluated with 
respect to public policy and their relevance to further refinement of the selection process. At 
each stage, the cost of further study and the usefulness of the information to the regulatory 
system would be integrated into the process. The stages would be coordinated, with the value of 
the information as the primary consideration. See id. at 16, 205-26, app. A; NATIONAL AcAD· 
EMY OF SCIENCES, PRINCIPLES FOR EVALUATING CHEMICALS IN THE ENVIRONMENT (1975). 
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the externality is created, sends a more direct signal to the industry 
than the after-the-fact Superfund tax. Firms would be taxed for activi-
ties they can control, rather than for existing harms whose cause they 
may not be able to identify.161 The tax structure could be designed in 
an innovative manner to encourage waste reduction. For instance, the 
tax could be keyed to levels of waste or human exposure, rather than 
production. The data on pollution discharges that would be needed to 
implement this approach is now being pulled together by the EPA 
pursuant to the EPCRA. 
A research super study also should be easier to administer than the 
current national Superfund program. CERCLA implementation must 
struggle with a number of unwieldy obstacles that would not be pres-
ent in the super study program. Chief among these obstacles is the 
need to treat and to relocate millions of tons of poisonous and contam-
inated material. A research program would have few such logistical 
problems because it would produce prospectively useful information, 
as opposed to trying to destroy or neutralize useless, dangerous waste. 
Each hazardous waste site is a complex ecological problem, unlike 
the relatively standardized procedures in toxics testing. Waste sites 
are located in a wide variety of natural and s~cietal settings, and can 
be handled by several different technologies, and treated to different 
grades of remediation. In practice, cleanup usually is too expensive 
and uncertain for the proponent of the cleanup, usually a state agency 
or the EPA, to complete it before seeking to involve PRPs through 
reimbursement. Therefore, the agency initiates legal action against 
PRPs and then litigates and negotiates the question of "How clean is 
clean?" for the particular site. The structure of the situation leaves the 
amount and the time frame of liability uncertain and allows disputes 
to persist among potentially responsible parties, thus discouraging 
enforcement. 162 
A super study program could be designed to produce less uncer-
tainty as to liability for study costs. Study costs could be standard-
161. See White, Economizing on the Sins of Our Past: Cleaning Up Our Hazardous Wastes, 
25 Hous. L. REV. 899, 908-11 (1988). Retrospective regulation is no longer limited to waste 
disposal sites. The Asbestos Information Act requires manufacturers of asbestos-containing 
building materials to provide the EPA with information on the years of manufacture, the types 
and classes of products, and other identifying data. The legislation is intended to assist the EPA 
in regulating asbestos cleanup and to simplify asbestos "cost recovery" litigation brought by 
owners of buildings constructed with asbestos materials. These lawsuits are often brought 
against large numbers of manufacturers because the plaintiffs cannot identify the maker of the 
particular product on which the claim is based. Congress Passes Bill Requiring Firms to Provide 
Product-Identification Data, 3 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 688 (1988). 
162. See Anderson, Negoliation and Informal Agency Action: The Case of Superfund, 1985 
DUKE L.J. 261 (thorough analysis of CERCLA's history and its lessons). 
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ized, just as research grants already are defined and limited. If 
reimbursements for studies were made from the general fund upon a 
showing that the study was conducted according to defined research 
protocols, liability for each study's cost could not be avoided by failing 
to cooperate, because the study would be completed before reimburse-
ment was sought. 
An important issue in the design of the super study program would 
be how to answer the parallel question to "How clean is clean?"; that 
is, "How toxic is toxic?" As a threshold distinction, the meaning of 
"toxic" differs in different testing and regulatory settings. An indica-
tor of toxicity that suggests further testing is advisable may be much 
weaker than the data required to impose a limitation on human con-
tact with a substance. The super study program administrators could 
select a formal means of defining indicators of toxicity sufficient to 
warrant further study or warning. These judgments are already being 
made in the course of administering federal research grant programs. 
The National Research Council's work in Toxicity Testing suggests 
that they may be further formalized. 
This brief outline suggests that it is possible to redesign informa-
tion laws to correct the present imbalance in the private research mar-
ket and bring into play actors who are disadvantaged by market 
dynamics. 163 A super study program could support research efforts 
outside the present government and manufacturing framework. Labor 
and consumer organizations and environmental consulting firms serv-
ing small businesses could take advantage of the program's reimburse-
ment provisions to engage private laboratories to conduct research. 
This would change existing incentives by presenting chemical manu-
facturers with the possibility that another party would produce infor-
mation on their products or pollution. The prospect of third-party 
testing would encourage businesses to do their own studies, to do them 
accurately, and to curtail human exposures and substitute less toxic 
chemicals to reduce any damage that research linked to their 
chemicals. 
163. This proposal would attempt to influence the market to attend more fully to public 
research priorities. Another current controversy on the commercialization of science, particu-
larly biology and biotechnology, centers on the reverse issue: the appropriateness of privately 
driven guidelines for public supported research. The role of independent, noncommercial institu-
tions in basic and applied scientific research has been the topic of debate during the past decade, 
as many universities and businesses have joined forces to conduct research, particularly in 
bioengineering. Perhaps the most radical proposal to combine commercial and public research is 
the Reagan administration's suggestion that the NIH be converted into a private research center, 
financed with money from the government, industry, and foundations. The proposal was made, 
in part, to allow for greater support for the biotechnology industry. See U.S. Weighs Turni11g 
Agency Into Private Health Institute, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1987, at Al, col. 4. 
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Chemical toxicity is a complex phenomenon. Research is an un-
predictable investment and we do not know if any national research 
program would substantially reduce the problem of uncertainty in 
chemicals regulation. However, since we are already investing in re-
search and have designed much of the regulatory system to depend 
upon information in order to function, the efficiency with which the 
private sector produces and uses the data should be a primary con-
cern. The law can be better designed to support private incentives to 
produce toxicity and exposure data. The same can also be said about 
the law's role in distributing data. 
VI. THE DATA SYSTEM AS A PUBLIC UTILITY 
The history of chemical information services in this country is a 
story of repeated flirtation with and hesitation over commitment to the 
concept of a national data system. 164 In the late 1970s, in the wake of 
the enactment of TSCA, an integrated national data system was 
planned, but when the Reagan administration took office, information 
policy shifted in a different direction. The EPA in particular has suf-
fered from inconsistent goals and support of its data project. Both 
private and public toxics data services are now evolving rapidly in re-
sponse to new disclosure laws. 165 Meanwhile, basic questions about 
what kind of long-term data resources the nation will have are being 
answered on an ad hoc basis, without the benefit of a considered legis-
lative policy. 
Two current developments outside the field of chemical regulation 
will shape the future of availability of this data. The first is the rapid 
diversification of telecommunications which has followed the restruc-
turing of the telephone system and is fueled by the continuing evolu-
tion of computer technology.166 The second is the reassessment of 
federal information policy, now taking place as government agencies 
164. As early as 1962, President Kennedy noted: 
The accumulation of knowledge is of little avail if it is not brought within reach of those 
who can use it. Faster and more complete communication from scientist to scientist is 
needed, so that their research efforts reinforce and complement each other; from researcher 
to practicing physician, so that new knowledge can save lives as swiftly as possible; and from 
the health professionals to the public, so that people may act to protect their own health. 
Special Message to the Congress on National Health Needs (Feb. 27, 1962), reprinted in PUBLIC 
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: JOHN F. KENNEDY 169 (1963). 
165. See, e.g., Cooper, Secondary Information Services in Science and Technology: A Wide-
Angle View, 33 J. AM. SocY. INFO. SCI. 152 (1982); Perspectives on the Federal Government and 
Health Information: Patterns, Impact, Expectations, 38 J. AM. SocY. INFO. SCI. 25 (1987); Wil-
liams, Electronic Databases, 228 SCIENCE 445 (1985). 
166. Noam, The Public Telecommunications Network: A Concept in Transition, 37 J. COMM. 
30 (1987). 
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move from paper to electronic media. 167 Some of the major issues on 
the congressional agenda in this area are equality of access to data, 
coverage and structure of data resources, quality of information, the 
appropriateness of duplication in some systems, and the proper bal-
ance between public and private services. 
As information dissemination is receiving attention, the time is 
right to design a data management and distribution system to serve 
environmental, occupational, and public health needs. Toxicity infor-
mation presents a special case for distribution, with both unique 
problems and possibilities. Given the market disincentives to disclo-
sure of toxicity, there is a basic role for the government in data 
distribution. 
The concept of the public utility provides an appropriate organiz-
ing principle for structuring that role. Widespread exposure to toxic 
chemicals makes toxicological knowledge a "good" needed by many 
sectors of society, but it must be developed and maintained in order to 
be useful. The market for this data has characteristics which have 
justified public utility treatment in other industries: a wide variety of 
users or potential users, with differing needs and different abilities to 
pay; even for those who are unable to pay, there are strong public 
policy reasons for providing them with the service. 
Traditional public utility regulation builds upon the notion of a 
"natural monopoly," which is said to exist when the structure of an 
industry is such that a single firm can meet the demand more effi-
ciently than can several or many firms. 168 Toxicology is a resource 
that in key respects is like the familiar utility services in energy, trans-
portation, and communications. We normally think of utilities as 
167. INFORMING THE NATION, supra note 36, at 209; see also G. BASS & D. PLOCHER, 
STRENGTHENING FEDERAL INFORMATION POLICY: OPPORTUNITIES AND REALITIES AT OMB 
(Benton Found. Proj. on Comm. & Poly. Options No. 6) (1989); J. SHATTUCK & M. SPENCE, A 
PRESIDENTIAL INITIATIVE ON INFORMATION POLICY (Benton Found. Proj. on Comm. & Info. 
Poly. Options No. 7) (1989). 
168. The legal notion ofa public utility has early common law origins, but began to develop 
into its present form in the latter half of the nineteenth century. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 
113 (1877); Hamilton, Affectation with Public Interest, 39 YALE L.J. 1089 (1930); McAllister, 
Lord Hale and Business Affected with a Public Interest, 43 HARV. L. REV. 759 (1930). Today its 
most important applications are to common carriers regulated according to statutory mandate. 
See, e.g., Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, tit. III, § 301, 48 Stat. 1081 (1934) (codified as 
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1982)). An excellent history and analysis of communications serv-
ices and their regulation is I. POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM (1983). 
Recent developments in the regulation of industries traditionally treated as natural monopo· 
lies are discussed in TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION TODAY AND TOMORROW (E. Noam 
ed. 1983); BREAKING UP BELL - EssAYS ON INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND REGULATION 
(D. Evans ed. 1983) [hereinafter BREAKING UP BELL]; see also VIDEO MEDIA COMPETITION -
REGULATION, EcONOMICS, AND TECHNOLOGY (E. Noam ed. 1985) [hereinafter VIDEO MEDIA 
COMPETITION]; DEREGULATION AND THE NEW AIRLINE ENTREPRENEURS (J. Meyer & c. 
Oster, Jr. eds. 1984). 
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large regulated monopolies which invest in real estate and hardware 
and provide energy and carriage service. In an "information econ-
omy," an investment in the research and training necessary to accu-
mulate and maintain useful knowledge may provide a basis for utility 
status. · 
Moreover, the particular character of modern transportation and 
communications utilities as systems, which increase in usefulness as 
they connect different geographic areas and segments of the society, is 
also applicable to chemical health information. Because toxicology is 
a body of knowledge that grows, expands, and corrects itself as it is fed 
with new data, it benefits from integrated communications channels. 
As a system, it is advanced most efficiently by making data intercon-
nections accessible to all possible users. The role of the database is 
central because it supports inferences that affect the study of related 
chemicals and also feeds basic understanding of the physical dynamics 
of the problem. The NTP has declared: 
The very body of NTP test data - an expanding body of comprehensive, 
comparable, reliable test results - is itself emerging as a research tool 
for developing or evaluating assay methods .... Toxicological characteri-
zation can be an immediate effective tool in prevention of chemically 
induced disease; in the long-run, this growing body of data can become 
its driving force.169 
Computerization has made possible the linkage of toxicity databases, 
has sped their development, and has increased their productivity. The 
large amount of data that is being accumulated can be put to work if 
properly managed.110 
Data resources thus would benefit from a specific and coherent fed-
eral policy on toxicity data management. Instead, we have been in-
vesting in a fragmented system that is developing in a haphazard 
fashion, according to principles that do not fit the character of infor-
mation as a process or a product. A brief history of recent federal 
information policy will be useful background for further examination 
of the issues. 
With the passage of the TSCA in 1976, the EPA was directed to 
coordinate agency data activities and, in 1978, the EPA established the 
Interagency Toxic Substances Data Committee to guide database de-
velopment. The TSCA also directed the Council on Environmental 
169. UNITED STATES DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL TOXICOLOGY PRO· 
GRAM: FISCAL YEAR 1987 ANNUAL PLAN 2. 
170. See Bloom, Introduction: Science, Technology and the National Agenda, in FRONTIERS 
IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 9-10 (1983). Bloom, Director of the Arthur v. Davis Center for 
Behavioral Neurobiology, the Salk Institute, stresses the importance to scientific and engineering 
progress of the effective use of new communication technologies to research and development as 
a whole. 
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Quality (CEQ) to study and report on the feasibility of a uniform 
chemical identification convention and an integrated data system. 171 
The CEQ reported that, although coordinated data systems would 
vastly enhance the federal effort to control toxic substances, no inte-
grated network existed. Rather, more than 220 separate systems had 
been developed by agencies involved in chemical regulation, "each 
serving different needs and organized in a different way. Some [were] 
sophisticated computer systems; others [were] simply manual files." 172 
Data had been compiled pursuant to at least fifteen different stat-
utes173 which were generally pollution or product quality control stat-
utes that did not focus on data needs.174 
The CEQ, in conjunction with the EPA and HEW, recommended 
the adoption of a uniform chemical coding system and the develop-
ment of a broad-based network of data systems, which it called the 
Chemical Substances Information Network (CSIN). 175 The network 
was conceived of as "a collection of discrete information sources 
which employs identical or compatible communication facilities, file 
structures, computer languages, or other means of retrieving data 
from the multiple sources."176 This "loosely coupled" network of var-
ious types of databases, rather than one central system, would include 
"all major federal chemical databases," as well as private systems and 
services. 177 Major components would include a directory of the infer-
171. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2609(b), 2624(b) (1982). 
172. TOXIC CHEMICALS AND PUBLIC PROTECTION, supra note 29, at 21. The report 
elaborated: 
Timely and convenient access among these systems has been very difficult. Information is 
often incompatibly described, categorized, and filed. One agency is frequently unaware that 
needed information exists in another system. Private users of chemical information have 
difficulty learning about or obtaining federally maintained information. Additional data sys· 
terns are maintained by states, industry, and other private institutions without being linked 
to each other or to similar federal systems. Although information may exist that would be 
valuable in understanding and controlling certain chemical hazards, it may not be readily 
available or usable for such purposes to scientists, public interest groups, and government 
and industry decisionmakers. 
Id. 
173. See OFFICE OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, CHEMICAL 
REPORTING AND RECORDKEEPING AUTHORITIES (1978). Elsewhere it has been estimated that 
there are 10,000 to 12,000 statutory provisions requiring the collection of information. See Bern· 
inger, Some Reflections on Federal Policy for Secondary Information Systems and Sciences, 1945· 
1981. 33 J. AM. SocY. FOR INFO. Sci. 161 (1982) (citing COMMITTEE ON THE RIGHT OF PRI· 
VACY, U.S. DOMESTIC COUNCIL, NATIONAL INFORMATION POLICY: REPORT TO THE PRES!· 
DENT OF THE UNITED STATES (1977)). 
174. See Chartrand, The Politics of Information, 36 J. AM. SocY. INFO. Sci. 376, 377 (1985) 
(citing CONGRESSIONAL RES. SERV., U.S. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, INFORMATION POLICY: 
PUBLIC LAWS FROM THE 97TH CONGRESS II (N. Miller ed. 1983)). 
175. See TOXIC CHEMICALS AND PUBLIC PROTECTION, supra note 29, at 24. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. at 25. As proposed by the CEQ, the network would contain two major divisions: all 
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mation on each system in the network so users could identify the sys-
tems that would meet their needs. It would also contain "[c]hemical 
identification data for an estimated one million chemicals with cross-
references to other files containing information on individual chemical 
substances," and a reference system for toxicological data and other 
relevant information.118 · 
The EPA was to be the lead agency in the development of the net-
work, assisted by the CEQ and the National Library of Medicine. 179 
The EPA began developing a means of classifying data within the sys-
tem, while the National Bureau .of Standards was charged with the 
development of quality assurance measures for the system.180 
Both the EPA and the National Library of Medicine already had 
experience in developing databases in this area. In 1973, the EPA be-
gan to share with the National Institutes of Health (NIH) the manage-
ment of a network of twenty chemical databases; this network, known 
as the Chemical Information System (CIS), was more limited than the 
CEQ's CSIN proposal. However, by 1984, the CIS contained a wide 
variety of physical and regulatory data on some 350,000 compounds. 
This database was available around the clock for emergencies. Forty 
percent of its users were federal agencies; the rest were businesses, uni-
versities, and foreign governments.181 
In addition to EPA resources, the National Library of Medicine 
has maintained a Toxicology Information Program for more than 
twenty years. That program has now developed a number of online 
information retrieval services, including the Registry of Toxic Effects 
of Chemical Substances (RTECS), produced by the National Institute 
for Occupational Safety and Health. RTECS today contains acute 
toxicity data for 7 6,000 substances.182 
When the Reagan administration took office in 1981, the CSIN 
the data collected under TSCA in one and a subfile of all the nonconfidential data to be available 
to the public in the other. Id. 
178. Id. at 25-26. 
179. Id. at 26. 
180. Id. at 29-30. 
181. See Fox, EPA Dumps Chemical Data System, 226 SCIENCE 816 (1984). Even as. the 
largest service that provided such information in 1983 the CIS' total number of current hours 
was under 7,000. See Williams, supra note 165, at 447. Today, as right-to-know laws are being 
implemented, that figure should rise. 
182. See Lindberg, Section IL Health Science Libraries. National Library of Medicine: The 
View at 150 Years, 38 J. AM. SocY. INFO. SCI. 34, 37 (1987). The largest of the Library's online 
retrieval services is TOXLINE, with about 2 million references and information on human and 
animal toxicity studies, effects of pollution, and adverse drug reactions. The Library also main-
tains CHEMLINE, a file of more than one million names for chemical substances representing 
650,000 unique compounds. MEDLINE is a medical information service of the same type, 
which contains abstracts of biomedical information. TOXNET contains toxicological data re-
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was little more than a proposal, and it was quickly shelved. The new 
administration's approach to government information services empha-
sized private management of data to a far greater extent than had pre-
vious administrations. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
directed that government information assets be commercialized and 
privatized on a broad scale. 
The Paperwork Reduction Act has been cited as the authority for 
the OMB's attempt to control federal information policy. The Act 
directs the OMB to supervise federal reporting and data collection, but 
does not deal explicitly with data dissemination. 183 Relying on its in-
terpretation of the Act, the OMB has issued a series of directives es-
tablishing a policy of cost recovery for government products, 
prohibiting government competition with the private sector in infor-
mation services or goods, and directing the transfer of many service-
oriented activities to the private sector. 184 At the same time that these 
directives were issued, budgets for information development and serv-
ices were reduced, particularly at the EPA. These decisions consti-
tuted a dramatic and controversial change in information policy. 185 
Many information experts have complained that this policy has been 
disastrous: user costs have increased dramatically; 186 numerous 
lated to the environment, emergency situations, and regulatory issues. The TOXNET system is 
"user friendly" and operates around the clock. Id. 
Another major center of related databases is the National Cancer Institute. See Berninger, 
supra note 173, at 165; Masys & Hubbard, Technical Information Programs of the National Can-
cer Institute, 38 J. AM. SOCY. INFO. SCI. 60 (1987). 
183. See 44 U.S.C. § 3501 (1982). 
184. See OMB Circular No. A-25, "User Charges," 52 Fed. Reg. 24,890 (1987) (Draft Revi-
sion); OMB Circular No. A-130, "Management of Federal Information Services," SO Fed. Reg. 
52,730 (1985); INFORMING THE NATION, supra note 36, at 261-70. Critics have also charged 
that the OMB has intruded into the substance of environmental regulation without legal author-
ity to do so. Shattuck and Spence report that a congressional study showed that the OMB was 
more likely to disapprove research projects with environmental and occupational health topics 
than those that concerned infectious diseases. Research on worker exposure to dioxin and EPA 
regulation designed to protect consumers and workers from asbestos were blocked based on 
OMB cost-benefit assessments. J. SHATTUCK & M. SPENCE, supra note 167, at 17. Bass and 
Plocher suggest that the OMB has failed to assist the EPA in its implementation of the EPCRA 
national toxics inventory. G. BASS & D. PLOCHER, supra note 167, at 38-39. But see Steinberg, 
OMB Review of Environmental Regulations.: Limitations on the Courts and Congress, 4 YALE L. 
& POLY. REV. 404 (1986). 
185. See, e.g., Palmer, Effect of Federal Programs on Health Sciences Libraries, 38 J. AM. 
SocY. INFO. SCI. 40-47 (1987) (citing a steady and disturbing decline in federal appropriations 
for health sciences libraries). Some viewed this trend as part of an overall tendency of the Rea-
gan administration to restrict access to information. See Group Assails U.S. Information Flow, 
N.Y. Times, May 12, 1988, at C33, col. l (in the past five years, one out of every four govern-
ment publications has been eliminated and government data is increasingly available only 
through computer access and with high user charges). 
186. See Smith, Online Government Databases: Into the Maelstrom, DATABASE, June 1988, 
at 56 (citing two examples of changes in rates after privatization). AG NET, a system developed 
by the Department of Agriculture, was contracted out to Martin Marietta in 1985. Before priva-
tization, access charges were $60 a year, plus a $42 per hour connect charge. Costs are now 
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databases that were not of immediate market value, but had research 
value, have disappeared;187 and, in the meantime, databases have not 
been enhanced nor has quality control been ensured.188 
Chemical toxicity databases were included in the new policy. The 
NIH reduced its support of the CIS to one part-time coordinator in 
1982. In 1983, partially pressured by budget cuts, the EPA began to 
consider phasing out all of its CIS management and coordination ac-
tivities and transferring them to the private sector. The EP A's sup-
port of the system was reduced and input was frozen for nearly twelve 
months: anyone taking over the system would face the very substan-
tial costs of updating the database. 189 
In early 1984, the EPA convened two panels, one of government 
experts and one of private sector representatives, to review EPA infor-
mation policy. The government panel, citing budget constraints, con-
cluded that the CIS databases should be turned over to the private 
sector, but only after a transitional period of federal guidance and sup-
port. The private sector panel suggested several alternatives, 190 but 
basically recommended that the government continue to manage de-
velopment of the system's data, while allowing most of its distribution 
to be handled by the private sector. The panel concluded that the CIS 
should not be required to become entirely self-supporting because 
some valuable databases, which cannot currently support themselves 
on the market, should have continued government support. 191 In spite 
of the panel recommendations, the EPA decided abruptly to hand over 
its databases to two private contractors, providing no federal support 
for updating them. The OMB rejected a proposal to allow the Na-
tional Science Foundation to oversee the transfer. Public and private 
users criticized the action, arguing that the system would become 
$1800 per year if accessed through the contractor or $25 per year plus $96 per hour if accessed 
through DIALOG. The Federal Elections Commission also privatized its database in 1985. On-
line charges went from $22 per hour to $4,000 per year for unlimited access under the new 
contractor. Id. at 60; see also Seghers, Computerizing Uncle Sam's Data: Oh, How the Public Is 
Paying, Bus. WK., Dec. 15, 1986, at 102-03. 
187. See Wolfe, Evolution of Contractor-Supported Health Information Activities, 38 J. AM. 
SoCY. INFO. SCI. 71 (1987); Fox, supra note 181; Smith, supra note 186 .. 
188. See Heller, The Chemical Information System and Special Databases, 25 J. CHEM. INFO. 
& COMPUTER SCI. 224, 225 (1985). 
189. Id. at 229. 
190. See Life Systems, Inc., Chemical Information System: A Blue Ribbon Panel Review 
(U.S. EPA, Aug. 1984) EPA - 200-02-80-002, PB 84-217777 [hereinafter Life Systems, Inc.]; 
Chemical Information Systems: A Government Panel Review (U.S. EPA, Aug. 1984) EPA-
200-02-84-003, PB 84-217769 [hereinafter A Blue Ribbon Panel Review]; Kadec & Jover, Trans-
fer of the Chemical Information System (CIS) to the Private Sector, 9 ONLINE REV. No. 4, at 297-
304 (1985). 
191. See A Blue Ribbon Panel Review, supra note 190, at 1-2, 3-11, 3-12; Heller, supra note 
188, at 229. 
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more costly and would deteriorate.192 The two contractors then made 
different plans for the system's future. 193 
Diversity of formats and decentralization are now dominant traits 
of toxicity information development. In the past few years, right-to-
know laws have opened up a new market for data that has spawned a 
variety of new information services geared to handling the Material 
Safety Data Sheets (MSDS), 194 but an early move to standardize the 
MSDS format languished after large firms objected that they were sat-
isfied with their own existing systems.19s 
The issue of a central data system has remained alive, however. 
Indeed, the problem of how to organize and support data distribution 
is more pressing today than ever before. Local governments and the 
nonbusiness public now need data access in order to evaluate informa-
tion being distributed pursuant to right-to-know laws. Federal agen-
cies that must comply with hazard communication and right-to-know 
requirements, such as the Department of Defense, are a major new 
user group of this data. Several proposals fo meet their needs are be-
ing discussed. For instance, the Chemical Manufacturers' Association 
has informally proposed that it develop and maintain a database. 
Meanwhile, the General Services Administration is being considered 
as a candidate to develop a system to support federal agency 
compliance. 
Federal information policy recently has been reviewed by the Gen-
eral Accounting Office and the Office of Technology Assessment 
(OTA). The OTA issued a report on federal information dissemina-
tion by all agencies. 196 In Informing the Nation, the OTA concluded 
that legislation is urgently needed to set the direction of federal infor-
mation policy for the years to come. The OTA stated that the govern-
ment is at a crucial point, at which the opportunities presented by new 
information technologies are substantial, 197 but the stakes, including 
the preservation and enhancement of public access to government in-
192. Critics of the move, "including members of the panels, now accuse the agency of using 
the reports as a 'smokescreen' and ignoring their recommendations." Fox, supra note 181, at 
816. 
193. See Fox, supra note 181. Private firms now may purchase the data through the Na· 
tional Technical Information Service (NTIS) and resell it to their clients. A description and 
analysis of the NTIS is contained in INFORMING THE NATION, supra note 36, at 13-14, 295-319. 
194. See, e.g., Heller, Computers in Chemistry: Numeric Databases for the PC. INDUS. 
CHEMIST, May 1988, at 40. 
195. Letter of James E. Brower, Ph.D., Manager of the Center for Assessment of Chemical 
and Physical Hazards, Brookhaven National Laboratories (Aug. 3, 1988). 
196. INFORMING THE NATION, supra note 36. 
197. See id. at 163 (comparing the yearly cost of distribution of the Congressional Record to 
depository libraries: paper copies cost $632.83, microfiche $83.62, CD-ROM $10.05). 
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formation, 198 are high and need to be carefully balanced by Congress. 
The OTA suggests that greater definition is needed of what are inher-
ently governmental information functions, as is a better understanding 
of the conditions for cost-effective contracting for information 
services. 199 
Toxicity and exposure data are a special instance of the broader 
problem which the OTA addressed. While federal information policy 
as a whole is being reexamined, legislators should reevaluate the CSIN 
concept of the 1970s and update it with increased participation by the 
private sector. Unassisted, the market will not produce an integrated 
universal service to support the economic, scientific, and governmental 
systems that use toxicity data, but a chemical toxicity data system 
would be a resource of such long-term value that it should not be left 
to develop on an ad hoc basis. National information policy should 
distinguish between the resources the private sector can offer and 
those it cannot, and design an approach to support and supplement 
the market. 
It was suggested earlier that data production, enhancement, and 
maintenance exhibit characteristics traditionally associated with the 
"natural monopoly" concept. Distribution of the data also has several 
characteristics which may justify structuring the service like common 
carriers. The telecommunications system illustrates how a data sys-
tem might be designed to provide needed information services. The 
new "open" structure of the telecommunications network - now a 
"network of networks" - provides a model for adapting the CSIN 
model to the contemporary mixed public/private information service 
market. 200 Indeed, the telecommunications system provides a useful 
analogy on several levels. 
For example, there is a parallel between the capital investment that 
forms a telephone company's rate base and the research and manage-
ment n~cessary to develop a data system. Toxicological information is 
expensive to produce and maintain. As data accumulates it must be 
updated and the data must also be consistent in terminology and pro-
duction methods.201 Quality control is an essential and costly condi-
198. Informing the Nation surveys the many federal statutory provisions that mandate public 
access to government information and recommends that Congress renew the commitment to 
public access in legislation that would reflect the changing conditions and needs of the computer 
age. Id. at 207-37, 255-60. 
199. Id. at 269. 
200. Noam, supra note 166, at 40. 
201. See Williams, supra note 165, at 446 (noting that one commercial strength of Lexis and 
Westlaw legal database systems is that everything entered in the database continues indefinitely 
to have value). Patent databases are similar. 
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tion of its value. Therefore, a service providing toxicological 
knowledge must be based upon substantial long-term investment. 
Training, equipment, and the existing information are imbedded costs, 
analogous to traditional telephone rate bases. As toxicology evolves, 
the nature of these costs may change. The early telephone system was 
a natural monopoly by virtue of its reliance on buried coaxial cable for 
transmission. The transmission lines were expensive and limited in 
their carriage capacity, making long distance telephone start-up costs 
similar to those of railroads. When the telecommunications system 
shifted from cable to microwave transmission in the 1950s and 1960s 
and most recently to fiber optics, the new technologies' increased ca-
pacity and lowered costs removed the underpinnings of much of the 
monopoly rationale. Emerging biological research tools, computer-as-
sisted statistical research, and medical breakthroughs may eventually 
have a similar impact on toxicology. For the present, production and 
maintenance of toxicological knowledge require substantial 
investment. 
This investment also requires at least some centralized planning. 
Even the diversified market of today's emerging telecommunications 
system is dependent on a basic shared infrastructure.202 The underly-
ing network was developed by the Bell System according to the vision 
. put forth by Theodore Vail, the president of AT&T from 1907 to 
1919.203 In the health sciences related to chemical toxicity, the federal 
government has for the most part provided the affirmative investment 
and stewardship which the market tends to discourage in this area. 
Public health and environmental agencies have functioned as a loosely 
coordinated consortium that invests in equipment, training and re-
search; judges the value of data; fosters the compatibility of different 
segments of the discipline; forecasts the future needs; and provides a 
range of data services. Coordination and combination are key produc-
tive functions here. These are functions that private firms are in no 
position to fulfill. However, federal policy has also failed to carry 
them out consistently, in part because of shifting policies. 
Another characteristic of toxicity data that supports the natural 
monopoly analogy is the fact that there is little value in duplicating the 
basic product. Repetitive bioassays or epidemiological studies are de-
sirable up to the point that a scientific consensus is reached on the 
toxicity of a chemical, but duplication is not an efficient response to 
market preferences. 
202. Noam, supra note 166, at 41-42. 
203. Bornholz & Evans, The Early History of Competition in the Telephone Industry, in 
BREAKING UP BELL, supra note 168, at 12-13. 
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In addition, compatibility of data formats and terms is essential to 
combining and comparing data. 204 But the market encourages diver-
sity, rather than integration. Variety of format is the very quality that 
data management firms offer in order to distinguish themselves from 
competitors. This is their defense against use of their product by other 
vendors, since the information otherwise is easily transferred. Small 
services with overlapping databases are developing, as in the very early 
history of telephone service in this country. Images of that quagmire 
are evoked by one user's complaint concerning the division of th~ 
EPA's CIS: "The two data bases soon will not be the same. For me, 
as an agency coordinator, it means we will be needing both. That 
means twice the overhead and twice the work."205 While the market 
might eventually coalesce and provide the standard, implied services, 
the seriousness of the present lack of information precludes a "wait-
and-see" attitude. With public health regulation dependent upon the 
coordination of exposure and toxicity data, the current fragmentation 
cannot be justified on the grounds that diversification is good or conve-
nient. Current laws do practically nothing to encourage the develop-
ment of coherence in toxicity data systems. 
Distribution of toxicity data services also has characteristics which 
are analogous to telecommunications. Data systems offer opportuni-
ties for cross-subsidies among various types of services. Different 
groups with information needs - industrial hygienists, researchers, 
consumers, public safety officers - will have different abilities and in-
centives to pay for the data. This capacity provides both pitfalls and 
opportunities. One criticism of the OMB's privatization scheme is 
that it institutionalizes public subsidies of private information services. 
Subsidies could work the other way; however. In a properly struc-
tured or supervised market, data services could make use of this vari-
ety by establishing price schedules keyed to each sector's ability to 
pay, with particular support for consumers, universities, and medical 
services.206 Subsidies by commercial users of chemicals would be ap-
propriate in this context even more so than the telecommunications 
204. See, e.g., Lindberg, supra note 182, at 39: 
For decades it has been recognized that the major impediment to the development and 
widespread adoption of broad computer-based information systems in medicine has been the 
standard vocabulary, terminology, definitions, and criteria for recording the results of bi- . 
omedical research and the events of clinical patient care. The result has been the inability of 
any medical-information system to communicate with another. The [National Library of 
Medicine] is working to remedy this deficit by developing a Unified Medical Language Sys-
tem .... 
205. Fox, supra note 181, at 226 (statement of Laurence Dusold of the FDA). 
206. The CIS service now offered by Fein-Marquart Associates has clients which include 
government, businesses, universities, and public interest groups. However, the firm discontinued 
its discount service for universities in 1988, and a substantial number discontinued their subscrip-
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system's subsidy oflocal service by long distance and business services. 
Here the consumer's very need for the data is caused by chemical 
firms' failure to internalize their health costs. Industrial rates might 
appropriately subsidize consumer services. 207 
The telecommunications model provides another feature that ap-
plies in this context, i.e., a two-way communication capacity. A well-
designed and well-supported toxicity data system could foster positive 
interaction. It could collect exposure and medical data from health 
professionals and industrial hygienists at the clinical level, while dis-
tributing important diagnostic and treatment toxicity information in 
return. The tools and prototypes for such a capacity are already being 
developed, as medical and industrial facilities are increasingly comput-
erized and investing in communication with data resources such as 
poison information centers and the National Library of Medicine 
services. 208 
If we view toxicology as a service the public needs and therefore as 
a potential public utility, with "natural monopoly" characteristics, a 
variety of organizational options becomes apparent. The telecommu-
nications model is the most elaborate. It would entail the establish-
ment of a regulated entity that would provide a basic system, on the 
common carrier model, from which other sectors in the market and 
the nonprofit private sector could develop derivative services. Tele-
phone service developed in the nineteenth century as a competitive 
service,2°9 then as a complex regulated monopoly. In the past decade, 
the telecommunications system has evolved into a mix of monopoly 
and competitive services, all working from a shared infrastructure. 
The most recent economic format of the telecommunications system is 
similar in several respects to the CEQ's original CSIN proposal and to 
more recent suggestions for the data system. Indeed, the private sec-
tions. The administrative job of keeping the accounts open was not considered worthwhile by the 
firm. 
207. The problem of designing a rate structure and, indeed, whether a system could support 
itself under any rate scheme, is beyond the scope of this Article. However, the size of the system 
would be a function of its resources. Also, the present limited system is heavily subsidized by 
general revenues. With continued public support and an increase in private support, a basic 
system which at least services federal, state, and local agencies, nonprofits, and universities seems 
feasible. 
208. See Lindberg, supra note 182, at 36-39; Hushon & Conry, Using the Micro-CSIN Work-
station to Provide Chemical Hazard Information, in HAZARD COMMUNICATION: ISSUES AND 
IMPLEMENTATION 176 (J. Brewer ed. 1986) [hereinafter HAZARD COMMUNICATION]. Hushon 
and Conry list more than 50 factual and bibliographic databases usable in a chemical emergency. 
The National Academy of Sciences has announced that it will recommend the establishment of 
an informational clearinghouse on occupational and environmental medicine, so doctors can get 
the information they need in a single telephone call. See Gap Found in Averting Workplace Dis-
eases, supra note 44. 
209. See Bomholz & Evans, supra note 203, at 7. 
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tor panel that advised the EPA in 1984 on the options for handling the 
CIS recommended that the government continue to produce and 
maintain an integrated system containing all the most frequently used 
files, those that are little used but have long-term scientific value, and 
an integrated directory system. The panel suggested that additional 
revenues for the government system could come from private enhance-
ment and commercial use of the files with market potential. 2I0 The 
OTA, in Informing the Nation, envisions a similar layered approach to 
public and private use of federal data. 2I I 
A mix of monopoly and competitive services could be fostered and 
new environmental and health services could develop, making use of 
the basic system. For example, the embryonic waste reduction move-
ment, which encourages industries to reduce their use of toxic chemi-
cals, relies on exchanging information about successful process 
substitutes. This kind of an information service could be added to a 
fundamental database. Product rating services and labeling, and new 
data communication businesses, might also spin off as distinct 
entities.2I2 
Regulatory models vary in their treatment of entry, rates, and in-
terconnection.2I3 The specific strategies that could be borrowed and 
applied to a toxicity data system are beyond the scope of this Article. 
However, entry regulation may be unnecessary if a national basic ser-
vice is guaranteed.2I4 The new information industry vigorously op-
poses "government competition" and argues that government should 
210. Life Systems, Inc., supra note 190, at 3-8, 9. 
211. See INFORMING THE NATION, supra note 36, at 269. 
212. See generally Freifeld, Labels and Material Safety Data Sheets in Hazard Communica-
tion, in HAZARD COMMUNICATION, supra note 208, at 39; Hadden, Labelling of Chemicals to 
Reduce Risk, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 235 (Summer 1983). 
The new information laws have stimulated demand for protocols of safe transport and use of 
chemicals and information services, such as toxic chemicals inventories and environmental infor-
mation clearinghouses. Government and private databases are being developed and made more 
accessible. Local fire departments, which are being inundated with MSDS forms, are contracting 
with consulting firms to manage this data. CHEMTREC, one of the largest emergency response 
communication centers, contains about 230,000 MSDSs, and its 3,000 member companies can 
access the database through a toll-free telephone number. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS RIGHT-TO-
KNOW NEWS, Oct. 10, 1987, at 4-6. Region VI of the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
has set up a region-specific, computer bulletin board on toxics. The database will be accessible by 
telephone and by computer. COMMUNITY RIGHT-TO-KNOW NEWS, June 27, 1987, at 4. EPA 
will establish an expanded public database, which in its first phase will contain information from 
the 140,000 to 160,000 annual release forms required by§ 313. See 42 U.S.C. § I 1023(j) (Supp. 
IV 1986); COMMUNITY RIGHT-TO-KNOW NEWS, May 22, 1987, at 1-2. 
213. See generally BREAKING UP BELL, supra note 168; DEREGULATION AND THE NEW 
AIRLINE ENTREPRENEURS, supra note 168; TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION TODAY AND 
TOMORROW, supra note 168; VIDEO MEDIA COMPETITION, supra note 168. 
214. See supra notes 172, 207. The EPA is preparing distribution of a number of data prod-
ucts derived from EPCRA's new National Toxics Release Inventory. The agency will produce 
and distribute to federal, state, and county level libraries data derived from the inventory in hard 
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rtot enter the market where the private sector is already operating. 
However~ some basic needs are not met by the market and, in any 
event, the public ·sector is the main supplier of data that the industry 
wishes to sell. 215 In light of the public source of so much of the data, it 
is appropriate to consider making a federal agency the basic data ser-
vice provider. 
A simpler approach than system development on the telecommuni-
cations model, and one that is closer to hand, would be to authorize 
and fund an agency - for example, the NTP or NIEHS - to study 
the adequacy of the present data system connections and to provide 
supplemental . services to those who cannot afford access to private 
services or who need data not offered by firms. This is already being 
done in certain areas by the National Library of Medicine and the 
EPA. The supplemental services should be subsidized, either through 
the sale of data to private firms or through a fund such as the one 
discussed in Part V. 
A narrower program - indeed, the minimum government role -
would be promulgation of standards to ensure compatibility and qual-
ity of data. There is precedent for standard-setting in the work of the 
National Bureau of Standards and, in the private sector, in the Ameri-
can Society for Testing and Materials, which has actively sought either 
legislation or a consensus on standard MSDS formats. 
copy, microfiche, and CD-ROM form. Telephone conversation with Gerard Brown, Chief of 
Nonconfidential Information Service Section, EPA Office of Toxic Substances (Jan. 24, 1989). 
The federal government has long provided information and information carriage. Its consti-
tutional mandate to provide a postal system is the most definite authority for this activity, but 
broader, more substantive participation may stem from the commerce clause and, for the states, 
from the police power. 
· Professor Pool maintains that entry and exit controls in communications media are unconsti-
tutional restrictions on speech. Pool, Comments on "The Future of Telecommunications Regula-
tion'~ in TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION TODAY AND TOMORROW, supra note 168, at 68; 
see also I. POOL, supra note 168. Would government regulation or provision of services in this 
area raise first amendment issues? Although we are accustomed to thinking of "science" as an 
academic pursuit, in its role as chemical hazard communication, it may be seen as commercial 
information excluded from the ambit of the first amendment. The first amendment implications 
are discussed in z. CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS (1947), and T. 
EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 697-714 (1970). 
215. See Giving Public U.S. Data: Private Purveyors Say No, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1989, at 
Al, col. 4. When the Federal Maritime Commission planned to make its electronic lists of ship· 
ping rates accessible to anyone with a computer, private companies that have made a business of 
providing this information to the public objected. As federal agencies move to put their informa· 
tion on electronic media, it will become more accessible, thus bypassing firms that have been 
packaging it electronically while the agencies were still relying on paper. According to The New 
York Times, there has been no opposition to the idea of putting the information on computers, 
but the OMB, the Information Industry Association, and the Journal of Commerce have opposed 
allowing the public to dial in to the agencies to read the filings directly. See id.; INFORMING THE 
NATION, supra note 36, at 207-36. More recently, the OMB has suggested that it will reconsider 
its position. OMB Proposes Switch in Information Policy, N.Y. Times, June 10, 1989, at A28, col. 
1. 
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This discussion admittedly leaves open many issues: it attempts 
only to draw the broadest outlines of possible systems and to suggest 
that, as with data production, the law related to data distribution 
could be structured to generate more efficient data use. Right-to-know 
laws recognize and rely on communication as a powerful regulatory 
instrument. Computers and information science provide tools that 
could be utilized to achieve a level of exchange that would strengthen 
regulation and improve the market's own screening functions.216 
VII. SOME PROBLEMS AND PRINCIPLES 
The information economics drawn upon here suggests that there 
are better ways of investing in information than the present law en-
courages. This analysis has attempted to point out some directions the 
law might take, if information production and use were to be given a 
more central role in toxics control. 
One major issue that has not been addressed here is the question of 
how to treat trade secrecy in the context of a comprehensive informa-
tion scheme. Current right-to-know laws provide some protection for 
trade-secret information. Neither OSHA nor the EPCRA require dis-
closure of the identity of chemicals claimed to be trade secrets, ev:en 
though the exempted chemicals are hazardous.217 However, these ar-
rangements do not seem satisfactory. On the one hand, firms would 
prefer not to disclose va,luable information at all, since secrecy is frag-
ile and may easily be lost. On the other, confidentiality agreements are 
burdensome and may inhibit research and medical practice. · Exempt-
ing trade-secret chemicals on a basis unrelated to the purposes of the 
information system may also have systemic repercussions, affecting 
the development of research and information services. 
The solution to the conflict between the two systems - toxics con-
216. See Access to Information: The Dream and Reality, 36 J. AM. SocY. INFO. Sc1. 383 
(1985); S. ZUBOFF, IN THE AGE OF THE SMART MACHINE: THE FUTURE OF WORK AND 
POWER 7 {1988) {discussing information technology as a tool for developing economic anc~ 
human potential of "work organizations"). 
217. Trade secret protection was one of the more controversial issues in the development of 
the OSHA Hazard Communication Standard. The definition of "trade secret" in OSHA's final 
standard is essentially the same as that of § 757 of the Restatement of Torts (First), which is 
commonly used by state courts in adjudicating trade secret disputes. See 19 C.F.R. 
§ 1910.1200(c) (1984). The Third Circuit rejected OSHA's earlier attempt to exempt chemical 
identity data from disclosure by redefining trade secrecy. See United Steelworkers v. Auchter, 
763 F.2d 728, 740 (3d Cir. 1985). . 
Some state laws provide for more government oversight of exemption claims than does 
OSHA. See HAZARDOUS MATERIALS: RIGHT-TO-KNOW NEWS, Nov. 15, 1985, at 5-12; 
RIGHT-TO-KNOW: A REGULATORY UPDATE, supra note 113. The California, Illinois, and 
Montana agencies rule on the validity of trade secret claims as they are submitted. Id. EPCRA's 
§ 313 requires publication of the fact of each trade-secrecy claim made in reports to the National 
Toxics Release Inventory. 
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trol and intellectual property law - will only come from careful anal-
ysis and compromise.218 We do not yet know how big a problem trade 
secrecy will be in the right-to-know context. The databases being de-
veloped under right-to-know laws will begin to indicate how large a 
portion of chemicals in the market is claimed as confidential.219 
Separate from the problem of producing and distributing data is 
the question of how the law should use toxicity data. Do legal stan-
dards for toxicity reflect rational and consistent recognition of the 
value of this information? Not surprisingly, the answer is definitely 
"no." 
Laws may require five types of actions with respect to chemicals: 
(1) mere disclosure of the identity of the chemical agent to which 
humans are exposed; (2) warning of its known hazards; (3) testing to 
determine hazards; (4) curtailing the exposure by reducing the dis-
charge of the chemical; and (5) compensation for any injuries proved 
to be caused by chemical exposure. Each entails different costs and 
will affect differently the individuals exposed and the public health sys-
tem. For instance, the monetary and social costs of disclosure, warn-
ing, and testing normally will be less than the cost of reducing or 
eliminating discharges or fully compensating groups of injured indi-
viduals. One would expect the law to establish separate but graduated 
tests of responsibility, tests that would call for different grades of proof 
and would reflect not only the costs and benefits inherent in each ac-
tion, but also established jurisprudential norms. Tort law and chemi-
cal regulation statutes contain legal standards for warnings, testing, 
exposure, and civil liability, but they do not form a coherent system. 
There are similar standards for very different activities and different 
standards for the same activity. 
For example, the standard incorporated in the TSCA which the 
EPA must meet before it may order a manufacturer to conduct testing 
on a chemical, is "may present an unreasonable risk of injury to health 
or the environment."220 This "unreasonable risk" test is similar to 
218. See McGarity & Shapiro, The Trade Secret Status of Health and Safety Testing Infor-
mation: Reforming Agency Disclosure Policies, 93 HARV. L. REV. 837 (1980). 
219. In a 1972-1974 survey, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NI-
OSH) asked 5,000 manufacturers for the ingredients of 85,000 products, but was able to deter-
mine the composition of only 40,000. The NIOSH survey determined that approximately 18,000 
of these contained at least one OSHA-regulated chemical and a large proportion was claimed as a 
trade secret. See Graney, Toxic Substances and Trade Secrecy, in PROCEEDINGS OF A NA-
TIONAL CONFERENCE TO INVESTIGATE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 78 (1977). However, 
initial figures for trade secrecy claims made to the EPCRA National Toxics Release Inventory 
are much lower. Out of approximately 70,000 filings with the EPA, there were about SO trade 
secrecy claims. Telephone conversation with Gerard Brown, Chief of the Nonconfidential Infor-
mation Service Section, EPA Office of Toxic Substances (Jan. 24, 1989). 
220. 15 U.S.C. § 2603(b)(2)(A) (1982). 
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language used for standards that determine actual human exposure, as 
opposed to disclosure, warning, or testing. "Risk" is a relatively gen-
eral concept. The amount and kind of information suggesting an "un-
reasonable risk" requiring further testing usually will not be the same 
as that which would support making rules to limit exposure. Physical 
similarity to a known toxic compound, with substantial levels of expo-
sure, may establish the first, while a full-blown risk assessment indicat-
ing the likelihood of a significant number of cancers may be required 
for the second. Most laws do not address the levels of information 
required for regulation221 or differentiate among bases appropriate for 
separate kinds of agency actions. 
At the same time, similar rules often establish very different infor-
mation standards for the same legal function. OSHA's Hazard Com-
munication Standard and the EPCRA use different methods to 
determine which chemicals are toxic and therefore must be accompa-
nied by warnings. OSHA requires that manufacturers and employers 
determine for themselves what hazards are posed by all of the chemi-
cals they handle, and the rules define "hazard" very broadly.222 How-
ever, the rules also presume chemicals to be hazardous if they appear 
on any one of several lists of suspect chemicals which have been pre-
pared by independent health research organizations. 223 Manufactur-
ers may tend to rely on the agency-endorsed lists, which means the 
open-ended definition probably does not expand the rules' coverage. 
To the extent that OSHA requires businesses to engage in health ef-
fects research - even library research - the rules burden smaller 
businesses.224 The open-ended coverage also results in unequal distri-
221. OSHA's Hazard Communication Standard and the FDA's Delaney Clause are excep-
tions. See supra notes 118-23 and accompanying text (explaining OSHA's rule). The Delaney 
Clause provides that if there is any evidence that tumors form following ingestion of a substance 
that would be a food additive, the substance cannot be used in food. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) 
(1982). However, the two provisions illustrate the same point. Both require action based on the 
existence of one scientific test showing adverse effects, but the two actions - warning and ban-
ning - are very different. 
222. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1988). The term "health hazard" includes chemicals that are 
carcinogens, toxic or highly toxic agents, reproductive toxins, irritants, corrosives, sensitizers, 
hepatotoxins, nephrotoxins, neurotoxins, agents that act on the hematopoietic system, and agents 
that damage the lungs, skin, eyes, or mucus membranes. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 app. A (1988). 
223. See supra note 119. 
224. 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (BNA), at 2148 (Apr. 24, 1987). The National Research Council of 
the National Academy of Sciences has recommended that the U.S. Department of Commerce 
develop educational resources to help small businesses acquire the information on chemical regu-
latory matters that is routinely available to large corporations and associations. NATIONAL RE-
SEARCH COUNCIL, DECISIONMAKlNG FOR REGULATING CHEMICALS IN THE ENVIRONMENT 
26. The costs of researching and communicating the results of all studies will discourage data 
production and again discriminate against smaller businesses. If chemical identity were univer-
sally disclosed and a unified toxicity database were made broadly accessible, then single study 
adverse effects could be easily revealed at the initiative of interested parties. 
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bution of information to workers in different businesses. 
The EPCRA uses two approaches to determine coverage. The 
emergency planning provisions, sections 301 and 312, incorporate 
OSHA's standard. The emergency releases provisions, section 303, 
limit reporting to one list of chemicals and section 313, on routine 
releases, uses another list. Using lists prepared by independent experts 
is preferable to employer assessment, as it assures credibility, clarity, 
and consistency. It also lightens the research burden on businesses 
and allows them to focus on the task within their bailiwick: identify-
ing sources of exposure. 
However, now that these lists have been codified, they are unlikely 
to be revised appropriately in the future, since the EPCRA authorizes 
additions to its lists and to the incorporated OSHA lists only by 
rulemaking. To be added to EPCRA's lists for reporting to the na-
tional inventory, chemicals must be shown to cause or to be reason-
ably anticipated to cause "significant adverse acute human health 
effects at concentration levels that are reasonably likely to exist beyond 
facility site boundaries as a result of continuous, or frequent re-
leases. "225 This is a high standard for warning and is inconsistent with 
the use of the right-to-know scheme. As with the TSCA's testing au-
thority, the EPCRA standard for expanding coverage parallels the 
standards for setting permissible levels of human exposure.226 Stan-
dards for warning - as for testing - need not be as high as those used 
to set exposure levels. Experience with the TSCA indicates that the 
EPA will not be able to add to these lists without engaging in lengthy 
review of the health effects of chemicals to be added and that private 
resources will be devoted to keeping chemicals off the lists.227 
Warning and testing standards require some level of suspicion 
about a chemical's health effects. However, where no data exist to 
implicate a chemical, disclosure of human exposure has not generally 
been addressed_ by the law. What should be the legal significance, if 
225. 42 U.S.C. § l 1023(d) (Supp. IV 1986). 
226. E.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1982). 
227. The EPA has announced a policy for reviewing petitions to change the§ 313 list. See 
52 Fed. Reg. 3479 (1987). The agency will base its review largely on the information submitted 
by the petitioner. Id. at 3481. Even with the heavy presumption in favor of toxicity established 
by the statute, this approach does not adequately account for biases in information presentation. 
Indeed, because of the commercial incentive described supra in Part II, businesses seeking to 
have chemicals removed from the list, rather than added to it, will dominate the listmaking 
process. 
Litigation concerning the lists of hazardous substances is already in full swing. E.g., Calumet 
Indus. v. Brock, 807 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (oil manufacturers sought precise interpretation 
of OSHA's carcinogen labeling requirement, but were denied standing); see also COMMUNITY 
RIGHT-TO-KNOW NEWS, Oct. 22, 1987; COMMUNITY RIGHT-TO-KNOW NEWS, Feb. 8, 1987, at 
5. 
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any, of an unwanted or unbargained-for exposure to a chemical not 
yet tested for toxicity? Does exposure necessarily trigger any individ-
ual rights or interests?228 Is it of any concern to society if there are no 
apparent ill effects at the time the exposure occurs? Economic analysis 
suggests that the answer to these questions should be yes; but under 
current right-to-know laws only chemicals that have already been 
shown to have some toxic effect are covered by disclosure require-
ments. Like the regulation and liability systems, right-to-know laws 
rely on the existence of health-effects data to trigger their affirmative 
disclosure requirements. Of the approximately. 67,000 chemicals in 
commercial use, only about 300 will be included in the EPCRA na-
tional inventory. A considerable number of chemicals are still "invisi-
ble" to their users. 
The principle of favoring broad disclosure should be basic to infor-
mation regulation. Catch-22 reasoning underlies the present de facto 
presumption of confidentiality of much chemical identity data: expo-
sure data will not be gathered and need not be disclosed, unless the 
substance can be shown to be toxic. However, it cannot be shown to 
be toxic unless its effects are studied, and they will not be studied if the 
chemical identity is. not released. Common law principles support dis-
closure of chemical identity data. There are strong normative argu-
ments for an entitlement to chemical identity data inherent in· the 
exposure situation. 229 Indeed, it is ironic that there is such ethical 
concern surrounding FDA guidelines for testing on humans, while 
outside the food and drug context, uncontrolled human exposure to 
toxic and unstudied chemicals is so widespread. Under economic tests 
for assignment of liabilities and entitlements, a disclosure requirement 
also fares well. Economic and medical transactions are facilitated by 
provision of chemical identity, but the costs of these transactions are 
prohibitive absent disclosure. The "cheapest cost avoider" is the re-
228. Do individual preferences have any legal significance in this context? Under the law of 
battery, an unwanted or offensive touching is actionable, but if a contact is socially useful, it may 
not be, even though it is a nuisance. 
Statutes have treated exposure in a variety of ways. Ex ante regulation of food and drugs 
requires proof of safety or low risk prior to exposure. This approach implies an interest in testing 
before exposure, but does not disclose to the individual who is exposed. Some statutes, such as 
the Clean Air Act, provide that agencies should release data in their files to those who request it, 
if it concerns pollution and is not considered confidential by the firm it concerns, but agency 
regulations may more specifically provide that health and safety data are generally considered 
nonconfidential. 42 U.S.C. § 7414(c) (1982); 40 C.F.R. § 2.301(a) & (c) (1988). 
229. The common law recognizes the interest in information that belongs to a recipient of an 
unwanted contact or intrusion, such as an actual or potential chemical exposure or the more 
standard tort of trespass. See generally R. FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY 
OF INFORMED CONSENT (1986). 
1860 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:1795 
searcher or the exposed person who can monitor and prevent health 
effects more easily, knowing the nature of the exposure. 
Selective application of disclosure requirements may also have un-
desirable secondary impacts on scientific research. Data collection 
based on proven toxicity channels scientific and economic resources 
along lines which may be neither the most protective nor the most 
efficient. If exposure data is not fully available, research and regula-
tory resources may be allocated to chemicals that are less toxic, while 
chemicals that are still "invisible" are ignored. Investments in label-
ing, training, and medical care, as well as research in health effects, 
inadvertently may be guided to chemicals of lesser toxicity, if disclo-
sure requirements are not consistently applied. 
Comprehensive disclosure is important because information 
behaves like the system it is; it does not consist of objects like conven-
tional products. This systemic character of information gives rise to 
other imperatives for information strategies in toxics regulation. Ac-
cess to chemical identity data facilitates the evolution of independent 
producers, interpreters, and verifiers of complex data. Access rights to 
information should be clear and the information should be available to 
all the relevant players to encourage the entry of those who do have 
incentives to provide information. Following the CERCLA model, 
those with incentives to produce the cost-reducing information should 
be linked to the most appropriate economic source of financial support 
for data production. Here, as with hazardous waste, that source is the 
activity which causes human exposure to risky chemicals and pro-
duces the need for health data. Regulation designed to foster produc-
tion and use scientific information must also incorporate unity of 
format, interconnection, and access to basic repositories of data. This 
unity is a prerequisite to communication and makes possible not only 
the development of new knowledge, but also standards and rating sys-
tems. Incentives to distort or minimize the negative commercial im-
plications of information can be controlled, at least partially, by 
disclosure of simple, nonmanipulable data, such as chemical identity. 
CONCLUSION 
Technologies that cause disease and environmental damage impose 
special burdens on the economy and the public. Just as certain bene-
fits are "public goods" in that everyone cannot help but benefit from 
them, certain costs may be termed "collective bads."230 Uncertainty 
about chemical toxicity has been so widely and successfully external-
230. See Barry & Hardin, supra note 51, at 31-33; Barry & Hardin, supra note 50, at 181-84. 
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ized that it is now a "collective bad." Present toxics laws are designed 
to rely on information, but the costs of uncertainty and of arranging 
for identification, study, and cure have been left to the public. At the 
same time, the market dynamics that discourage private production of 
toxicity information have shaped law and science policy. The notion 
of "uncertainty" itself and the ways it is expressed in regulation have 
been influenced by economic factors. Health and environmental laws 
can pe written with these influences more consciously in mind and 
research and dialogue at a much higher level - both of volume and 
sophistication - than exists today could be produced. The words of 
Samuel Johnson express the spirit that should inform the law: 
"Knowledge is of two kinds. We know a subject ourselves, or we 
know where we can find information upon it."231 
231. I J. BOSWELL, THE LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON 558 (1791) (Everyman ed. 1906). 
